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DISCRIMINATORY PAY AND TITLE VII:
FILING A TIMELY CLAIM
MEGAN E. MOWREY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
Generally, an employee who claims
sex, or national origin.
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII must file his or
her claim within 180 days of the employer's alleged discriminatory
conduct. 2 The Supreme Court examined the time limitations3
under Title VII in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.
The Supreme Court's resolution of Ledbetter rested on the Court's
characterization of the conduct that triggers the time limitation in
cases concerning discriminatory pay. 4 The Court held that
discriminatory pay is a discrete act, similar to, for example, a
discriminatory termination or denial of a promotion. 5 The Court
found that a claim for discriminatory pay must be filed, therefore,
For
within 180 days of the employer's initial illegal act.6
Ledbetter, the Court's decision meant that her case was time
barred, because the primary basis for Ledbetter's lawsuit
7
concerned conduct that occurred prior to the 180-day period.
Among the implications of the Ledbetter decision, the Court
considered two critical factors in reaching its determination as to
* Assistant Professor, Clemson University, College of Business and
Behavioral Science.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000). The statute also allows a 300-day time
limitation "in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which
the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local
agency with authority to grant or seek relief .. " Id. States in which the
300-day time period is permitted are known as deferral states. C.J.S Civil
Rights § 536 Deferral States, (2007).
3. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
4. Id. at 2165-66.
5. Id. at 2175. Further, see this Article's discussion of Nat'l. Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (Morgan), in Section III,

distinguishing between a claim alleging a discrete act of discrimination or a
claim alleging a hostile environment, the latter of which may involve conduct
that occurs prior to expiration of the 180-day period.
6. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.

7. Id. at 2167.
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whether the acts alleged by Ledbetter constituted discriminatory
conduct. First, as noted, the Court held that discriminatory pay is
a discrete event.8 The moment the act occurs, the Title VII clock
begins to run and potential plaintiffs must file within 180 days of
the act or be barred from filing. 9 While the Court refused to
consider that the discriminatory act was repeated with each
paycheck, the circuit courts had found, in cases similar to
Ledbetter, that the employer repeated its illegal conduct. 10
The second factor that the Court considered underlies
discrimination claims in general: a discriminatory act must pose
an intentional harm, and this harm must be sufficiently material
in order to trigger many of Title VII's protections.11 The Supreme
Court has discussed the standard of materiality in discrimination
extensively, with examples including: Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 12 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 13 Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Svcs., Inc., 14 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,15 and
8. Id. at 2165.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2169; see also infra Section IV. See, e.g., Anderson v. Zubieta, 180
F.3d 329, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that "[t]he Courts of Appeals
have repeatedly reached the.., conclusion" that pay discrimination is
"actionable upon receipt of each paycheck").
11. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2171. The Court reiterated that the claim must
be filed within 180 days, thus preventing actions against an employer where a
worker fails to file a timely suit alleging a discrete act of discrimination and
intent. Id.
12. See 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986) (demonstrating that discrimination based
upon sex that does not affect economic benefits may create a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII); see also Katherine S. Anderson,
Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Harassment After Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1275 (1987) (suggesting that
courts should impose a vicarious liability standard upon employers for
sexually discriminatory acts of supervisors who create hostile and offensive
work environments).
13. See 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (examining a hostile work environment in
the spirit of Meritor, but also considering the proper standard to determine
whether specific conduct rises to the level of a discriminatory act in violation
of Title VII by examining a number of factors including the severity and
frequency of the discriminatory acts); Jeffrey M. Lipman & Hugh J. Cain,
Evolution in Hostile Environment Claims Since Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 47 DRAKE L. REV. 585 (1999) (providing an in depth analysis of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision); Edward Cerasia II, Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.: An Objective Standard, but Whose Perspective?, 10 LAB. LAW. 253 (1994)
(examining the Harris Court's adoption of a "reasonable person" standard to
determine if a work environment is hostile for purposes of the application of
Title VII).
14. See 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) (announcing that the standards and
elements of a Title VII claim also govern same-sex sexual harassment); see
also Ramona L. Paetzold, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, Revisited: The
Aftermath of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 3 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 251 (1999) (arguing that the parameters of causation for same-sex
sexual harassment in terms of Title VII violations appeared expansive in

20081
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Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White.16 With respect
to the Ledbetter decision, is 180 days enough time to generate a
17
recognizable act of pay discrimination?
This Article discusses Ledbetter and the issues that Ledbetter
presents for claims of illegal pay discrimination. Section II begins
by briefly discussing the decisions of both the Eleventh Circuit 8
and the Supreme Court. 19 Section II then gathers facts about
Ledbetter's circumstance from the several courts that heard the
21
case, 20 as well as from Ledbetter's Brief to the Supreme Court.
An examination of the facts through several sources is necessary,
because the nature of the discrimination allegedly suffered by
Ledbetter changed, depending on whether a court allowed
Ledbetter to introduce only evidence of discriminatory conduct
Oncale, but in reality were very narrow in application).
15. See 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding that an employer may raise an

affirmative defense that it took reasonable care to prevent and correct
harassing activity when it faces vicarious liability for the discriminatory
activities of supervisors and the harassment did not result in a tangible
employment action like a firing or demotion); see also Megan E. Mowrey &
Virginia Ward Vaughn, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment
Culminating in Constructive Discharge:Resolving the Tangible Employment
Action Question, 14 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 101 (2004) (examining
the ramifications of the Supreme Court's failure to decide whether or not
voluntary resignation from employment in the face of intolerable working
conditions is a constructive discharge that qualifies as a tangible employment
action); see also Kelly Collins Woodford & Harry A. Rissetto, Tangible
Employment Action: What Did the Supreme Court Really Mean in Faragher
and Ellerth?, 19 LAB. LAW. 63 (2003) (chronicling lower courts' struggles to
determine what constitutes "tangible employment action" that would preclude
application of the employer affirmative defense).
16. See 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006) (regarding what constitutes illegal
retaliation in violation of Title VII); see also John Sanchez, The Law of
RetaliationAfter Burlington Northern and Garcetti, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
539 (2007) (arguing that the Burlington Northern standard of "materially
adverse" should apply to First Amendment retaliation claims of public
employees); Megan E. Mowrey, EstablishingRetaliation for Purposes of Title
VII, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 893 (2007)(examining the circuit split on the
standard for discriminatory retaliation prior to Burlington Northern and the
subsequent decision by the Supreme Court).
17. Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Ledbetter analyzes how incidents of
discrimination often accrue over time before they are cognizable as material
both in terms of the application of Title VII and also with regard to a victim's
knowledge or understanding that the discrimination is even happening.
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178-88. Materiality may become an issue when
considering whether the suit may be filed in the first place. See infra Part V.
18. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir.

2005).
19. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. 2162.
20. Id.; Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Inc., 421 F.3d 1169 (11th
Cir. 2005); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Inc., No. 99-C3137-E, 2003 WL 25507253 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2003).
21. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., Inc., No. 05-1074, 2006 WL 2610990 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2006).
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that occurred within the 180-day limitation specified by Title VII,
or if a court considered facts and conduct that occurred prior to the
180-day period.
Section III of this Article precisely evaluates Ledbetter by
exploring more deeply the Supreme Court's decision and
expanding this Article's summary of the decision. Section IV
investigates the circuit court cases that dealt previously with pay
discrimination, including the Ledbetter decision in the Eleventh
Circuit.
Section V evaluates the Supreme Court's Ledbetter
decision in terms of materiality of discriminatory conduct. Section
V also explores the practical context for filing pay-related
discrimination claims and provides a hypothetical example derived
from the facts offered by Ledbetter to examine the results for
similarly situated plaintiffs. Lastly, Section VI concludes the
evaluation, discussing efforts by Congress to change the law
governing discriminatory pay.

II. LEDBETTER IN THE CIRCUIT AND SUPREME COURTS: A BRIEF
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS AND AN EXAMINATION OF THE FACTS
CONTEMPLATED BY THE COURTS
A.

Summary of the Eleventh Circuit Court Decision:
22
Ledbetter v. Good Year Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.

Lilly Ledbetter worked for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.
(Goodyear) for nineteen years before her retirement. 23 When she
left, her salary was the lowest of her fellow managers. 24 When
Ledbetter found out about her pay discrepancy, she filed a claim
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
alleging, among other theories of liability, discriminatory pay
25
based on sex.
22. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d 1169.
23. Id. at 1173-75.
24. Id. at 1174.
25. Id. at 1175. Ledbetter found out about the pay discrepancy late in the
game; Ledbetter did not know that she was paid less until an anonymous note
reflecting this fact was given to her. Valerie Dowdle, Ledbetter, Lilly v.
Goodyear
Tire
&
Rubber
Co.,
MEDILL
NEWS
SERVICE,
http://www.docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/003741.php (posted June
26, 2006). Justice Ginsburg also stated in her dissent that Goodyear's
confidentiality policy prevented Ledbetter from an earlier discovery of the pay
difference. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181-82. Although the district and circuit
court decisions, as well as the decision reached by Supreme Court and the
briefs to the Court, fail to mention the anonymous note, Ledbetter's access to
the note was reported by the press. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, A Hearing
Without Being Heard, WASHINGTON POST, February 20, 2007, at A03. The
note was also discussed in an interview with Lilly Ledbetter. See Interview
with Lilly Ledbetter, YouTube.com, http://youtube.comlwatch?v- YhSFttshcPk
&mode=related&search= (last visited May 15, 2008) (The interview was
posted in association with information made available by an organization,
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Ledbetter filed suit, and the only issue to reach the district
court concerned Ledbetter's pay discrepancy, claimed by Ledbetter
26
to violate Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination.
After hearing the evidence presented by Ledbetter and Goodyear,
the jury awarded Ledbetter $223,776 in back pay, $4,662 for
mental anguish, and $3,285,979 in punitive damages. 27 The court
reduced the punitive damage award to $295,338 consistent with
the statutory guidelines for punitive damages in claims
29
28
establishing employment discrimination. Goodyear appealed.
The primary issue on appeal concerned whether Ledbetter
had timely filed her Title VII claim. 30 Title VII requires claims of
discrimination to be filed within 180 days of the employer's alleged
illegal conduct. 31 When Ledbetter won in the district court, the
jury verdict contemplated that each and every paycheck that she
received was a discrete act, contaminated by discrimination, thus
reviving the 180-day limitation with each paycheck. 32
The
Eleventh Circuit took a different approach.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the case, holding
that Ledbetter's claim was largely, but not entirely, stale. 33 The
Eleventh Circuit stated that the only potentially illegal act
available for purposes of claiming sex discrimination was a
performance review and its associated pay decision which took
place in February 1998. 34 The 1998 review was Ledbetter's last
performance appraisal prior to her retirement. 35 The Eleventh
Circuit stated that Ledbetter could challenge the 1998 review as
36
discriminatory because it fell within the 180-day limitation.
Goodyear agreed with this finding.37 Goodyear argued, however,
that because the 1998 review and pay decisions were not

People
for
the
American
Way
and
an
associated
Web
site,
www. CorrectTheCourt.com). The district court proceeding also established
that Goodyear's confidentiality policy generally prevented employees from

knowing what their coworkers earned. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21,
at 26.
26. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1175.
27. Id. at 1175-76.
28. Id. at 1176; see also 42 U.S.C § 1981(a)(b)(3)(D) (2000) (limiting
punitive damage awards to $300,000 in cases involving employers such as

Goodyear). The remitted award also included attorney fees and costs.
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1176.
29. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1176.
30. Id. at 1178.
31. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); supra note 3 (discussing deferral
states).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1176, 1181.
Id. at 1189-90.
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1175, 1180.
Id.
Id.
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motivated by discrimination, Ledbetter failed to prove a Title VII
violation.38 The Eleventh Circuit sided with Goodyear, holding
that the performance review and subsequent salary award 39 failed
to pose employment practices that a reasonable jury could find
40
discriminatory.
B. Summary of the Supreme Court Decision:
41
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision reached in the
Eleventh Circuit, holding five to four 42 that the employee's claim
was barred given the time limitations of Title VII. 43 The Court
identified two analyses of the facts, as proposed by Ledbetter,
44
which would have allowed Ledbetter's claim to be timely filed.
First, Ledbetter argued that each paycheck, consisting as it did of
less pay than her male coworkers, constituted a violation of Title
45
VII and kept open the window of opportunity for her to file.
Second, Ledbetter claimed that the employer's initial decision to
pay her less than her male coworkers was the relevant act for
purposes of triggering the statute, and because this decision
"carried forward intentionally discriminatory disparities from
prior years," 46 the claim was valid through the discriminatory
47
decision's current effects.
Despite Ledbetter's assertions to the contrary, and even if the
employer's prior actions were discriminatory and the impact was
ongoing, the Court held, "current effects alone cannot breathe life
into prior, uncharged discrimination .... Ledbetter should have
filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly
discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to
her."48 Ledbetter did not do so, and the paychecks that were
issued to her within the 180 days prior to the filing of her EEOC
49
charge did not provide a basis for overcoming her failure to file.
38. Id. at 1177.
39. The performance review was the one aspect of the employer's action
that did constitute a timely action in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion. Id. at

1189.
40. Id. at 1178, 1189.
41. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
42. Id. at 2165. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices
Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Id. Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg in her dissent. Id. at 2178.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2169.
45. Id.
46. See id. (quoting Reply Brief for the Petitioner, at 20, Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, No. 05-1074, 2006 WL 3336479 (U.S. Nov.
14, 2006).
47. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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C. The Facts Considered by the Eleventh Circuitand the Supreme
Court and the DiscriminationAlleged by Ledbetter
Ledbetter's lawsuit concerned whether discriminatory pay
decisions might establish a claim, regardless of whether the
decisions were made before or after the 180-day time period
specified by Title VII, so long as the impact of the pay decisions
were felt within the 180-day period.50 Whether Ledbetter had a
viable claim based upon actions beyond the 180-day window
depended on the particular court's interpretation of the facts.
Regarding the first alternative, if a court allowed Ledbetter's
claim, it also considered facts stretching back throughout
Ledbetter's nineteen-year tenure with Goodyear because Ledbetter
asserted that the employer's actions could be felt long after the
actions occurred. 51 Regarding the second alternative, if the claim
was denied, only the discriminatory conduct falling within the 180day period could be examined, regardless of the initial conduct's
ongoing impact. 52 Whether a specific court allowed Ledbetter's
claim depended on the facts considered by that court in reaching
its decision - the facts shifted depending on each individual court
and whether that court permitted Ledbetter's claim. 53 The shift
did not contemplate the truth or falsity of the facts, but rather
concerned the totality of the facts examined by the court. To
understand the evidence presented in the case, the facts evaluated
by the Eleventh Circuit, as well as the facts analyzed by the
Supreme Court and the facts discussed in the Brief for the
Petitioner before the Supreme Court, must be discussed.
The district court's slip opinion did not extensively discuss the
facts that Ledbetter introduced at trial and were admitted into
evidence - facts both heard and considered by the jury when it
reached its verdict. 54 The Eleventh Circuit's review focused on an
analysis of Ledbetter's 1998 performance ratings and did not
generally reference Ledbetter's supervisor's statements and
conduct that were made pre-1998, which Ledbetter alleged to have
been discriminatory and the primary basis for her claim that her
performance ratings, subsequent pay, and associated raises were
based on discriminatory animus. 55 The Eleventh Circuit limited
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Ledbetter, 2003 WL 25507253, at *3 (holding "because of the
continuing nature of the disparate salary payments, Plaintiff is entitled to
recover for the disparate salaries from March 25, 1996, until her retirement
thirty-one months later.").
52. See, e.g., Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178; Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1189.
53. Ledbetter, 2003 WL 25507253; Ledbetter, 421 F.3d 1169; Ledbetter, 127

S. Ct. 2162.
54. See Ledbetter, 2003 WL 25507253, at *2 ("Plaintiffs charge of
discrimination relates back to March 25, 1998, when she completed the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")'s questionnaire.").
55. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1180-81. The performance reviews were used in
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its discussion of the facts because, "[t]he rub is that Ledbetter did
not want to stop at the 1998 raise decision ... [t]his necessarily
put at issue every salary-related decision made during Ledbetter's
nineteen-year career."56 Having reached its decision that the 1998
performance review constituted the only timely claim for
employment discrimination, the court did not consider seriously
57
the pre-1998 facts heard in the district court.
When the Eleventh Circuit heard Goodyear's appeal,
Goodyear acknowledged that Ledbetter was paid less for the same
work performed by men in the same position, but Goodyear
insisted that the discrepancy was due to Ledbetter's poor
performance ratings.58
The pay discrepancy principally was
attributed to small, or nonexistent, raises awarded to Ledbetter
during her tenure with Goodyear, and according to Goodyear was
consistent with Ledbetter's poor ratings and not due to
discriminatory conduct by Goodyear. 59 In particular, Goodyear
argued that Ledbetter's poor 1998 performance review was free of
discrimination and Ledbetter's low pay was attributable to that
review, rather than any illegal discriminatory act.6 0
In response to Goodyear's account of her lower pay and poor
ratings, Ledbetter countered in the district court with
explanations of her own, which Ledbetter repeated in her Brief for
the Petitioner to the Supreme Court. 61 First, Ledbetter presented
evidence in the district court, including her own testimony and the
testimony of two additional workers, "of widespread discrimination
against female managers at the [Goodyear] plant. '6 2 Second, the
district court heard testimony that "the performance rankings did
not accurately reflect the true quality of [Ledbetter's] work .... ,,63
As evidence of the questionable accuracy of the ratings, the district
court heard the testimony of a coworker, and also examined notes
from Ledbetter's supervisors, all of which asserted that Ledbetter's
performance ratings were inaccurate. 64
In this regard, Ledbetter further testified that her direct
supervisor threatened to give Ledbetter "poor evaluations if she

Goodyear's system of annual merit raises. The raises "were based primarily
on each employee's performance in relation to that of other salaried employees
in the business center during the previous year." Id. at 1172.
56. Id. at 1180.
57. Id. at 1184-85.
58. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 4-5.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1186-87.
61. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 5-8. One should keep in mind
that the district court jury heard Ledbetter's explanations, found them
credible, and held for Ledbetter. Ledbetter, 2003 WL 25507253, at *1-2.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 5.
64. Id.
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did not succumb to his sexual advances."65 Additionally, Ledbetter
experienced harassment including statements by her direct
supervisor that, "[y]ou're just a little female, and these big old
guys, I mean, they're going to beat up on me and push me around
and cuss me." 66 The harassment continued and Ledbetter testified
The direct supervisor's
that her evaluations worsened. 67
evaluations were the primary source of information for
establishing Ledbetter's pay and for denial of Ledbetter's raises,
68
eventually leading, according to Ledbetter, to her pay disparity.
Third, Ledbetter testified in the district court regarding the
"discriminatory animus by plant officials toward [Ledbetter],"
including statements made by the Plant Manager that "the plant
69
did not need women, that we didn't help it, we caused problems."
Ledbetter continued to testify that an employee in Goodyear's
personnel office repeated the discriminatory sentiments when the
employee told her, "I was a troublemaker ...these men had good
careers at Goodyear... and that Goodyear really didn't need
70
troublemakers like me."
Both the Eleventh Circuit's and the Supreme Court's opinions
failed to include any detailed facts describing the acts that were
alleged to have been discriminatory, because each court
determined that a timely claim had been foreclosed, thus
rendering treatment of those facts irrelevant to consideration of
the case. 71 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the need to
demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII,72
which, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged, Ledbetter may have
74
established 73 but which Goodyear successfully rebutted.
65. Id. at 6.

The supervisor was removed initially from involvement in

Ledbetter's ratings, but was later reinstated to this position. Id. at 5-6.
Ledbetter discussed the supervisor's conduct in an interview. Interview with
Lilly Ledbetter, YouTube.com, http://youtube.com/watch?v=LkOFOlc2j3A&
mode=related&search= (last visited May 15, 2008).
66. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 6.
67. Id.
68. Id. Because neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court
allowed evidence of the supervisor's acts to be used as evidence of Ledbetter's
discrimination claim, the facts regarding the supervisor's conduct come largely
come from the Petitioner's Brief to the Supreme Court, as she sought to have
the Court include the supervisor's acts in making her case. Id. The facts that
Ledbetter submitted were heard in the district court and were considered by
the jury in reaching its verdict. See id. at 5-10.
69. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 8.
70. Id.
71. See generally,Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. 2162; Ledbetter, 421 F.3d 1169.
72. See the Eleventh Circuit's discussion of the requirements of the prima
facie case for employment discrimination. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d 1169, 1185 (a
female plaintiff must show that the she holds a position that is similar to that
of a higher paid male employee).
73. Id. at 1186.
74. Id.
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Similarly, the Supreme Court discussed generally the need to
establish intent in Title VII cases and only referred to the
discrimination to which Ledbetter was allegedly subjected in three
sentences in a footnote:
Ledbetter's claims of sex discrimination turned principally on the
misconduct of a single Goodyear supervisor, who, Ledbetter
testified, retaliated against her when she rejected his sexual
advances during the early 1980's, and did so again in the mid-1990's
when he falsified deficiency reports about her work.
His
misconduct, Ledbetter argued, was "a principal basis for [her]
performance evaluation in 1997." Yet, by the time of trial, this
75
supervisor had died and therefore could not testify.
The Court's brief mention of the events underlying
Ledbetter's claim was not made specifically to address the lower
courts' analysis of the evidence, as might be true if a lower court
applied, in the Supreme Court's opinion, an incorrect rule of law,
or to evaluate the lower court's application of the law to the facts,
as might be the case if the Court believed that the correct rule was
applied but the lower court's analysis in light of the law was
incorrect. Rather, the facts were discussed in the footnote when
the Court wished to emphasize Ledbetter's current inability to
raise a timely claim when the elements of a Title VII claim require
proof of intent, such intent being more difficult to prove as the
Court noted, than the establishment of an employment practice
76
itself.
By limiting the facts to those relating primarily to the 1998
performance review, both the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme
Court decimated Ledbetter's argument that a discriminatory pay
decision that reached back, prior to the statutory 180-day
limitation, may form the timely basis of a Title VII lawsuit,
despite the claim made by Ledbetter that the impact of
discriminatory pay decisions carried forward to future pay awards
made within the 180-day period. 77
Section III of this Article examines the decision of the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court cases on which the Court
relied to support its decision in Ledbetter. Section IV investigates
the decision of the Eleventh Circuit as well as the decisions

75. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2171 n.4.
76. Id. at 2171-72. Similarly, no mention is ever made of the anonymous
note in the Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court opinion. Ledbetter did not
know, until after the 180-day deadline, that she may have been receiving
lower pay than her coworkers. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
77. For example, if Ledbetter's supervisor made sexually harassing
statements in connection with her 1998 evaluation, Ledbetter would have
been allowed to sue, and the supervisor's conduct would have been
contemplated, in reaching the courts' decisions.
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reached by other circuit courts that also have dealt with the issue
of discriminatory pay.
III. THE SUPREME COURT: LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR TIRE &
RUBBER COMPANY, INC.78

As noted in Section II of this Article, the Supreme Court held
that Ledbetter failed to timely file her claim of employment
discrimination. Section III below discusses the Court's decision
more extensively and examines the cases relied upon by both the
Court and the parties to the dispute.
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Alito introduced the majority opinion by stating:
In light of disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to the
proper application of the limitations period in Title VII disparate80
treatment pay cases, 79 compare [Ledbetter in the Eleventh Circuit]
with Forsyth v. FederationEmployment & Guidance Serv.;81 Shea v.

Rice,82 we granted certiorari .... 83

While raising the issue of the split among the circuit courts,
the majority then declined to discuss the circuit court cases that it
78. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. 2162.
79. The case and its review proceeded without a claim made under the
Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000), present in the initial
complaint. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1175 n.7. When asked by Justice Ginsburg,
"What happened to the Equal Pay Act claim?" Transcript of Oral Argument at
*8-9, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Inc., No. 05-1074, 2006
WL 3422212 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2006). Petitioner's counsel replied, "We should
have objected to the failure to reinstate the Equal Pay Act claim. We didn't;
we didn't think it was that important [at] the time because we still had the
Title VII claim ....

It's establishing the same case ...

in each instance.

Although the jury has to find intentional discrimination in the Title VII
case . . . in both cases, the jury always has to consider the basis of prior
decisions that are the cause of the present disparity." Id. at *9; see Ledbetter,
127 S. Ct at 2176, 2176 n.9 (the majority's discussion of the EPA claim).
80. 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005).
81. 409 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2005).
82. 409 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
83. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166 (internal citations omitted); see also infra
Section TV (discussing Forsyth and Shea). The Court's description of the
circuits' split fails to note that other circuit courts have considered the issue of
discriminatory pay (or at least ongoing impact), and probably would have
preserved Ledbetter's claim as timely. See, e.g., Connolly v. McCall, 254 F.3d
36, 41 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a new § 1983 claim challenging a New York
discriminatory pension policy accrued each time the plaintiff was forced to
give up accrual of certain pension benefits in his new civil service position in
order to retain his NYPD pension). The Court pointed only to two other
circuits, in addition to the Eleventh, as illustrative of the circuits'
disagreement, but again, the circuits uniformly, with the exception of the
Eleventh, had announced law that likely would have allowed Ledbetter's
claim. See infra Parts III, IV.
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cited8 4 - Forsyth 5 and Shea.86 Instead, the Court recognized its
prior decisions, specifically identifying United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 87 Delaware State College v. Ricks,88 Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc.,89 and National RailroadPassenger Corporation
v. Morgan,90 as necessarily compelling the dismissal of Ledbetter's
claim. 91
The Court failed to analyze the various circuits'
approaches in more contemporary decisions, particularly after its
own decision in Morgan92 (or, for that matter, the cases that
preceded it). The salience of Morgan for the Ledbetter Court
prompts a thorough discussion of Morgan's influence on the
Court's holding.
93
1. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan

The Court's Morgan decision was particularly important to
Ledbetter because Morgan concerned whether a claim for
employment discrimination may be made when the conduct
precipitating that claim occurred beyond Title VII's 180-day
limitation. 94 Ledbetter argued that Morgan did not prevent her

84. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165-78.
85. Forsyth's claim was dismissed for failure to state an issue of triable
fact, but the court evaluated the timeliness of Forsyth's claim in dicta.
Forsyth, 409 F.3d at 566-67.
86. The D.C. Circuit found that each paycheck received within the Title VII
statute of limitations period constituted a discrete discriminatory act and
therefore the plaintiffs claim was not time-barred. Shea, 409 F.3d at 449.
The dissent in Ledbetter, however, cited both Forsyth and Shea as examples of
circuit court cases that were consistent with holding that Ledbetter's claim
was timely. 127 S. Ct. at 2184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
87. 431 U.S. 553 (1977); see also Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
88. 449 U.S. 250 (1980); see also Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2168.
89. 490 U.S. 900 (1989); see also Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2168-69.
90. 536 U.S. 101 (2002); see also Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169.
91. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169. The Court also cited to additional cases:
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam); Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at
2172-74, 2177; Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
91. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2172, 2177.
92. See infra Part IV (providing a detailed discussion of Forsyth, 409 F.3d
565 (2d Cir. 2005), Shea, 409 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and other circuit court
cases).
93. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
94. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169. In Morgan, an African American
employee claimed that he was subjected to a hostile work environment on the
basis of race and that the employer was furthermore guilty of retaliatory acts
in violation of Title VII. 536 U.S at 104. The issue before the Court was
whether the employee could claim a violation of Title VII even if the
discrimination occurred before the time limitation set by the statute. Id. at
105. The Court parsed discrete acts of discrimination from acts constituting a
hostile work environment. Id. at 110-21. The Morgan Court held that, for a
claim alleging a discrete discriminatory act, "such as termination, failure to
promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire," the claim must be brought
within Title VII's time limitation. Id. at 105, 114. For a claim alleging a
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claim, but rather, that her situation was consistent with Morgan,
"[r]ecurring violations of Title VII give rise to recurring claims,
95
each with its own limitations period."
Contrary to Ledbetter's assertion, the Court noted in
Ledbetter that, "[i]n Morgan, we explained that the statutory term
"employment practice" generally refers to "a discrete act or single
'occurrence' "that takes place at a particular point in time." 96
Morgan distinguished claims for discrete acts of discrimination
from claims of a hostile environment. 97 The Court described
Ledbetter's pay and Goodyear's associated pay-setting decisions as
discrete actions. 98 Because the period for filing charges under
Title VII generally begins when the act occurs, the Court
understood its prior cases (and its decision not to treat pay
discrimination differently from other forms of discrete
discriminatory acts) as compelling its conclusion that Ledbetter's
claim was not filed on time:99 "The EEOC charging period is
triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place. A new
violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not
commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory
acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past
discrimination."100
According to the Morgan Court, the timing of the employer's
allegedly discriminatory acts was most important for purposes of
determining the employee's ability to sue and recover under Title
VII. 101 Morgan asserted 'he was consistently harassed and
disciplined more harshly than other employees because of his

hostile work environment, "consideration of the entire scope of the hostile
work environment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statutory time
period, is permissible for purposes of assessing liability, so long as an act
contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time
period." Id.
See also Benjamin J. Morris, A Door Left Open? Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan and Its Effect on Post-Filing Discrete Acts in Employment
Discrimination Suits, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 497 (2007) (detailing the postMorgan circuit court split over whether or not the holding in Morgan applies
to continuing discrete acts of discrimination that occur after the initial filing of
a complaint).
95. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 17.
96. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169 (citing Morgan, 536 at 110-11).
97. 536 U.S. at 122.
98. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
99. Id. at 2169.
100. Id. The Court went on to note, "[b]ut of course, if an employer engages
in a series of acts each of which is intentionally discriminatory, then a fresh
violation takes place when each act is committed. Id. The Court cited to
Morgan for the ability to file based on fresh violations. Id.; Morgan, 536 U.S.
at 113; see also Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2174 (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 911)
(discussing a facially neutral employment structure in Bazemore).
101. 536 U.S at 110-11.
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race."' 102 The acts of which Morgan complained occurred both
inside and outside the time limitations imposed by Title VII.103
The Morgan Court looked to cases in the Seventh, 10 4 Ninth,10 5 and
Fifth 106 Circuits. The Ninth Circuit, where Morgan originated,
held that courts may "consider conduct that would ordinarily be
time barred 'as long as the untimely incidents represent an
ongoing unlawful employment practice."'1 07 The Morgan Court
noted that the Ninth Circuit, thereby, adopted "the continuing
10 8
violation doctrine."
In concert with its analysis of prior cases involving
discriminatory pay, the Morgan Court noted its decision in
Bazemore examining a discriminatory salary structure that,
"although the salary discrimination began prior to the date that
the act was actionable under Title VII, '[e]ach week's paycheck
that deliver[ed] less to a black than to a similarly situated white is
a wrong actionable under Title VII ... ."'109 Ultimately, the
102. Id. at 106 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 25a n.1).
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operation, 78 F.3d
1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996)). The court stated:
[Pllaintiff may not base [the] suit on conduct that occurred outside the
statute of limitations unless it would have been unreasonable to expect
the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on that conduct, as in a case in
which the conduct could constitute, or be recognized, as actionable
harassment only in the light of events that occurred later, within the
period of the statute of limitations.
Id. at 1167.
105. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106-07 (citing Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (the Ninth Circuit's resolution of
Morgan) (quoting Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 1999)).
106. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 107 n.3 (quoting Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors,
715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983)):
The Fifth Circuit employs a multifactor test, which, among other things,
takes into account: (1) whether the alleged acts involve the same type of
discrimination; (2) whether the incidents are recurring or independent
and isolated events; and (3) whether the earlier acts have sufficient
permanency to trigger the employee's awareness of and duty to
challenge the alleged violation.
Id.
107. 536 U.S at 107 (citing Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d
1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000), (the Ninth Circuit's resolution of Morgan) (quoting
Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations
omitted)).
108. 536 U.S at 107.
109. Id. at 112 (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395). The Court also cited to
the following cases to demonstrate that discrete acts that fall outside the
statutory time period will bar a Title VII claim and each discrete act starts a
new statutory period to file a complaint: Electrical Workers v. Robbins &
Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 234 (1976) (holding that the date of a "tentative"
discharge pending arbitration constituted the discrete discriminatory act);
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986) (per curiam) (holding that even
though salary discrimination began prior to the statutory period, the delivery
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Morgan Court concluded that only discriminatory conduct that
occurs within the time limitations may support a claim that
alleges a prohibited discrete act, stating that, "Each discrete
discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging
that act."110
Furthermore, for a hostile environment action, the series of
conduct contemplates a single act for purposes of a hostile
environment claim,"' "In order for the charge to be timely, the
employee need only file a charge within 180 or 300 days of any act
that is part of the hostile work environment." 11 2 Because Morgan's
charge involved a series of discriminatory acts, including racial
jokes, racially derogatory acts and racial epithets, 11 3 the series
indicated a hostile work environment that could support a claim,
particularly because at least some of the acts occurred within the
4
time limitations.1
One of the most relevant aspects of the Morgan Court's
decision for purposes of the Court's later consideration in Ledbetter
came from the Morgan Court's statement that: "The existence of
past acts and the employer's prior knowledge of their occurrence,
however, does not bar employees from filing charges about related
discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory
1
and charges addressing these acts are themselves timely filed." 15
The prior acts, moreover, may be evidentiary "in support of a
6
timely claim."11
The Ledbetter Court's disinclination to identify the contrary
view rested primarily on the Court's opinion that Morgan (as well

of each paycheck that was representative

of the

discriminatory

salary

structure constituted an actionable discrete act); United Airlines v. Evans, 431
U.S. 553, 558 (1977) (holding that an employee's discharge was the discrete
act that began the statute of limitations and the employee was precluded from

asserting a continuing violation of Title VII for failure to give her credit for her
prior service upon rehire because "United was entitled to treat [Evans's
resignation] as lawful after [she] failed to file a charge of discrimination
within the charge filing period then allowed by statute."); Delaware State
College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980) (holding that an academic
institution's failure to grant tenure to a professor based upon national origin

could constitute a discrete discriminatory act but that the offer of a "terminal"
contract to teach for another year did not breath life into the cause of action as
a "continuing violation" that became actionable upon termination).

536 U.S. at 112-13.
110. 536 U.S at 113.
111. Id. at 118.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 120.
114. Id. at 121.
115. Id. at 113.
116. Id.

Morgan,
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as Lorance, Evans and Ricks 1 7) eliminated the continuing
violations doctrine. 118 As stated in Morgan: 19
The [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals applied the continuing
violations doctrine to what it termed "serial violations," holding that
so long as one act falls within the charge filing period,
discriminatory and retaliatory acts that are plausibly or sufficiently
related to that act may also be considered for the purposes of
121
liability. 120 With respect to this holding, therefore, we reverse.
The Court in Morgan held that a Title VII action may classify
an employer's illegal conduct as either a discrete act of
discriminatory treatment or an action claiming a hostile
environment, but, even if continuing impact is shown, the claim
1 22
must fall into one of these two categories:
There is simply no indication that the term "practice" converts
related discrete acts into a single unlawful practice for the purposes
of timely filing ....

We have repeatedly interpreted the term

"practice" to apply to a discrete act or single "occurrence," even when
123
it has a connection to other acts.

Despite Morgan's treatment of the continuing violations
doctrine, several post-Morgan opinions delivered by the circuit
courts identify Morgan as failing to eliminate the spirit of the
continuing violation doctrine, even if Morgan eliminated the
doctrine itself; those circuits held that discriminatory acts
involving pay are, if not continuing violations, representative of
repeated discrete employment decisions that pose a fresh
discriminatory violation of Title VII with each paycheck. 24
117. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 907-08 (citing Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449
U.S. 250 (1980) and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977)) (the
EEOC charging period ran from the time when the discrete act of alleged
intentional discrimination occurred, not from the date when the effects of this
practice were felt); see also infra Parts 111.2, 111.3.
118. 127 S. Ct. at 2167-70.
119. 536 U.S. at 112.
120. Morgan, 232 F.3d at 1015.
121. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 (internal citations omitted).
122. Id. at 111.
123. Id.
124. For example, the Second Circuit in Forsyth stated:
[E]ach repetition of wrongful conduct may, as Morgan taught, be the
basis of a separate cause of action for which suit must be brought within
the limitations period beginning with its occurrence. A salary structure
that was discriminating before the statute of limitations passed is not
cured of that illegality after that time passed, and can form the basis of
a suit if a paycheck resulting from such a discriminatory pay scale is
delivered during the statutory period.
409 F.3d at 573 (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 396 n. 6); see also Cardenas v.
Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 2001); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training,
Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 347-49 (4th Cir. 1994); Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep't of Natural
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Ledbetter similarly, and unsuccessfully, argued that Morgan
required the Court to find that each paycheck was a discrete act,
each one a repeated discriminatory act, and each one established a
125
new claim.
As noted previously, while Morgan was important to the
26
Court's Ledbetter decision, the Ledbetter Court also cited Evans,1
27
128
Ricksl
and Lorance
as establishing a line of cases that
demonstrated Ledbetter incorrectly argued that the Court should
consider the employer's actions taken prior to the 180-day
period.1 29 These three cases and their place in the Court's
resolution of Ledbetter will now be discussed.
1 30
2. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans

In Evans, an employment policy implemented by United Air
Lines (United) mandated that all flight attendants be
unmarried.1 31 Evans, newly married, was forced to resign under
the policy.132 United violated Title VII by maintaining the
employment policy,1 33 United changed it, and eventually re-hired
Evans.13 4 Evans's present claim against United, however, was
based on United's failure to retroactively grant her credit under its
seniority system for the years that Evans had previously been
employed under the now-defunct policy.1 35 The Evans Court held
that, while Evans's claim against United for the unlawful seniority
system itself was time barred, the circumstances of her prior
discriminatory treatment could "constitute relevant background
evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice

Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1025-29 (7th Cir. 2003); Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned
Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Gibbs v. Pierce County
Law Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1986);
Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 2002);
Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d

448, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
125. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 13, 15-17, n.9. The dissent
would classify discriminatory pay as a unique form of discrimination, akin to a
hostile environment, precisely because of pay's repeated impact, as is the case
in a hostile environment where repeated acts pose a continuing violation
despite the fact that some of the acts may fall outside of the 180-day period.
Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2181.
126. 431 U.S. 553 (1977); see also Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2167-68, 2174.
127. 449 U.S. 250 (1980); see also Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2168.
128. 490 U.S. 900 (1989); see also Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2168-69.
129. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2169.
130. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
131. Id. at 554.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 554; Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1972).
134. Evans, 431 U.S. at 555.
135. Id. at 555-56.
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... 136 The Evans Court stated that Evans's employer
was not actively discriminating against her at the time of her
lawsuit. 137 Evans endured no present violation, since United's
policy had been changed and its seniority system was currently
valid. 13
Drawing the distinction among three alternatives,
namely: (1) a current violation; (2) a past violation with current
consequences; and (3) a remedied, and merely past illegal act, the
Court stated that, "a challenge to a neutral system may not be
predicated on the mere fact that a past event which has no present
legal significance has affected the calculation of seniority credit,
even if the past event might at one time have justified a valid
139
claim against the employer."
Returning to the Ledbetter decision, the Court noted that in
Evans, "[w]e concluded that the continuing effects of the
precharging period discrimination did not make out a present
violation."14 0 Ledbetter's argument to the contrary was, therefore,
unsuccessful. 141

is at issue...

3.

142
Delaware State College v. Ricks

Important as well to Ledbetter was the Court's holding in
Ricks.1 43 The employee in Ricks, a Liberian, claimed a violation of
Title VII for national origin discrimination when his employer
denied him tenure in the college where he worked. 144 The district
court dismissed the action as time-barred, stating in its opinion
that the effective period for purposes of the suit was the time
between the denial of tenure and the filing of the action by the
employee.1 45 Because the suit was filed after Title VII's 180-day
136. Id. at 558.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 559-60.
139. Id. at 560.
140. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2168.
141. Id. at 2174. But see Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 386-88 (holding that salary
disparities between African American and white public employees that
predated the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which made the law applicable to
public employers, could be considered in determining whether or not there was
current ongoing discrimination). See also Hazelwood School District v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 301 (1977) (a situation factually similar to Bazemore, in
which public school district employees claimed pay discrimination that
occurred both prior and subsequent to the 1972 amendment of Title VI1).
Under Hazelwood, if the pay rate was discriminatory before and after 1972,
the prior discrimination could provide evidence of the employer's
discriminatory pattern and practice, even if the pre-1972 conduct was not
compensable. 433 U.S. at 309-10 n.15. The Court remanded the matter for a
determination of whether or not Hazelwood engaged in a pattern of
employment discrimination after the Title VII amendments. Id.
142. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
143. 127 S.Ct. at 2168.
144. 449 U.S. at 252, 255.
145. Id. at 254-55.
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time limitations had expired, the action was stale. 146 The Third
Circuit reversed, holding that the dates relevant to the time
limitation were the point at which the employee's one-year
employment extension terminated (the extension having been
granted during Ricks's appeal of the tenure decision) and the date
of the claim, rather than the decision to deny tenure as the point of
origin. 147 According to the Third Circuit, because the final tenure
decision might be appealed successfully in situations such as that
presented by Ricks, the plaintiff should not be expected to sue
148
until he or she is ultimately fired.
The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
In sum, the only alleged discrimination occurred - and the filing
limitations period therefore commenced - at the time the tenure
decision was made and communicated to Ricks. That is so even
though one of the effects of the denial of tenure - the eventual loss of
49
a teaching position - did not occur until later.1
The Ricks Court sought to balance the ability of aggrieved
employees to take advantage of the protections afforded by Title
VII with the statutory time limits incorporated into the statute. 150
"'[T]he period allowed for instituting the suit inevitably reflects a
value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in
favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in
prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones."'151
Despite the
argument that the "pendency of the grievance" should toll the
statute of limitations 152 (during which the employee initially
complained of his tenure decision), the employee was time barred
from filing a complaint, and the Ricks Court held that the tenure
decision itself was the relevant unlawful employment practice
under Title VII - "limitations periods normally commence when
the employer's decision is made."' 53 The Ledbetter Court held that
Ledbetter's failure to file within the 180-day window, like Ricks,
54
prevented Ledbetter as well from filing a timely action.

146. Id. at 255.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 255-56.
149. Id. at 258.
150. Id. at 259.
151. Id. at 259-60 (quoting Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454, 463-64 (1975)).
152. Id. at 261.
153. Id. (quoting Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 23435 (1976)).
154. 127 S. Ct. at 2168. One should note that, while the defendant's
application of its seniority system in Morgan to some extent implied an
ongoing effect on Morgan's current employment, the denial of tenure in Ricks
was a discrete event akin to termination.
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1 55
4. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., et al.

Similar in some respects to Evans, Lorance concerned a
seniority system challenged by former employees who claimed
unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII.156 The seniority
system itself was not challenged; the suit concerned the
application of the system and its alleged manipulation by the
employer, which the Court described as an alteration of
157
contractual rights.
The Lorance Court stated that the "allegedly discriminatory
adoption [of a seniority system that is nondiscriminatory in both
form and application]" is the triggering event for the statute of
limitations period under Title VII,158 and each application is
nondiscriminatory. 159 The Lorance Court drew attention to Ricks
and Evans 60 as establishing the Court's rejection of the continuing
violation doctrine: "[w]e recognize, of course, that it is possible...
to regard the employer as having been guilty of a continuing
violation which 'occurred,' (for purposes of Title VII) not only when
the contractual right was eliminated but also when each of the
concrete effects of that elimination was felt."' 16' The Lorance Court
held, however, that, consistent with Evans and Ricks (as well as
with a third case, Machinists v. NLRB162), the present effect of a
decision, even if it was discriminatory, cannot support a claim of a
continuing violation if the decision itself occurred outside the time
limitations. 163 Regardless of the past act's present effect, the claim
was time-barred; 64 at some point, Title VII claims become stale
and the law's interest in protecting only valid claims will be,
1 65
thereby, protected.
The Lorance dissent raised objections to the decision similar
to those of the dissent in Evans, namely, that the present effect of
a discriminatory act may give rise to a Title VII claim, both when
an employer violates Title VII and when the employer's actions
pose a continuing violation: 166 "Under [the] continuing violation
theory, each time a discriminatory seniority system is applied, like

155. 490 U.S. 900.
156. Id. at 901-03.
157. Id. at 905.
158. Id. at 911.
159. Id. at 912.
160. Id. at 906-08.
161. Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
162. See 362 U.S. 411, 417 (dealing with the timeliness of an unfair labor
practice charge under the National Labor Relations Act and determining that
the limitations period runs from the time a system is adopted); see also infra
Part 111.5.
163. 490 U.S. at 906-08.
164. Id. at 906.
165. Id. at 911.
166. Id. at 914.
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each time a discriminatory salary structure is applied, an
independent 'unlawful employment practice' under [Title VII]
167
takes place, triggering the limitations period anew."
The Lorance dissent expressed concern for future plaintiffs
who attempt to challenge seniority systems as discriminatory,
stating, that "employees must now anticipate, and initiate suit to
prevent, future adverse applications of a seniority system, no
168
matter how speculative or unlikely these applications may be."
Partly in response to the issues raised by the dissent, Congress
amended Title VII in 1991 regarding discriminatory seniority
systems. 169
The majority in Ledbetter acknowledged that Congress
abrogated the Lorance holding through the 1991 amendment of
Title VII in 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(e)(2), particularly through the
amendment's treatment of seniority systems. 170 According to the
majority, because Lorance relied on Evans and Ricks, the Evans
and Ricks holdings standing together, without Lorance, justified
the Court's ruling. 171 The majority also noted that Congress let
the holdings in Evans and Ricks stand, meaning, in the majority's
opinion, that the rule of law announced by Evans and Ricks is still
72
relevant.1
The Ledbetter Court identified the application of the seniority
system in Evans, the tenure decision in Ricks, and the calculation
of seniority in Lorance as discrete discriminatory acts that
triggered the time limitations of Title VII.173 The Ledbetter Court
then proceeded to analyze how its holding in Bazemore is entirely
consistent with the Ledbetter holding even though Ledbetter relied
upon it to establish the fact that each paycheck she received
constituted a discrete discriminatory act that refreshed the Title
7
VII statute of limitations.1 4

167. Id. at 915.
168. Id. at 919. The dissent pointed to several hurdles, including its
statement that, "The majority today continues the process of immunizing
seniority systems from the requirements of Title VII ...employees must now

anticipate and initiate suits to prevent future adverse applications of a
seniority system, no matter how speculative or unlikely these applications
may be." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(e)(2).

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

127 S. Ct. at 2169 n.2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2169.
Id. at 2172-74.
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5. Bazemore v. Friday 175
Decided in 1986, Bazemore v. Friday76 concerned claims of
employment discrimination stretching back to 1971.177 The issues
posed by the case included pay disparities between white and
African American employees of the North Carolina Agricultural
Extension Service (the "Extension Service"). 178 The Bazemore
Court held that, while Title VII did not cover public employers
until 1972,179 the employees filed valid claims of discrimination
because:
A pattern or practice that would have constituted a violation of Title
VII, but for the fact that the statute had not yet become effective,
became a violation upon Title VII's effective date, and to the extent
an employer continued to engage in that act or practice, it is liable
180
under that statute.
The employees could not recover damages for discriminatory
conduct that occurred prior to 1972, but the employees could
recover damages for the discriminatory conduct that occurred
subsequent to Title VII's extension to public employees in 1972.181
In Bazemore, the Court made the statement that: "[e]ach
paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated
white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact
that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title
VII."182 Ledbetter relied upon this statement in her argument,18 3
175.
176.
177.
178.

478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 394. In Bazemore, previous to the 1972 amendments to Title VII,

the North Carolina Extension Service had openly operated under a two-tier
employment system, and the plaintiffs argued that the old, two-tier system
currently impacted their wage:
Prior to August 1, 1965, the Extension Service was divided into two
branches: a white branch and a "Negro branch." Only the "Negro
branch" had a formal racial designation. The "Negro branch" was
composed entirely of black personnel and served only black farmers,
homemakers, and youth. The white branch employed no blacks, but did
on occasion serve blacks. On August 1, 1965, in response to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the State merged the two branches of the Extension
Service into a single organization.
Id. at 390-91. The change was made in 1965 despite the fact that public
employers were not covered by Title VII until 1972. Id. at 391.
179. Id. at 394. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination by private
employers and was extended to public employers through the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, effective 1972. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)(a),(b),(f,(h).
180. 478 U.S. at 395. The Bazemore Court also noted, "the Extension Service
discriminated with respect to salaries prior to the time it was covered by Title
VII does not excuse perpetuating that discrimination after the Extension
Service became covered by Title VII." Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 396.
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but the Ledbetter Court ultimately held that the argument was
inapplicable.184 (The 11th Circuit did as well155 ). The Ledbetter
Court distinguished cases such as Bazemore from cases that
presented facts that foreclose a timely claim, such as
Ledbetter's. 86
The Ledbetter Court's analysis of Bazemore
8 7
characterized the Bazemore pay structure as discriminatory.1
The pay structure in Ledbetter's case, however, was described as:
"facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied. The fact that
precharging period discrimination adversely affects the calculation
of a neutral factor (like seniority) that is used in determining
future pay does not mean that each new paycheck constitutes a
new violation and restarts the EEOC charging period."' 88 Because
the pay structure was not discriminatory, and because Ledbetter's
alleged discrimination flowed from the actions of her employer's
agents, namely, the actions of Ledbetter's supervisor, Ledbetter
9
could not rely on Bazemore.18
The Ledbetter Court, thereby, dismissed Ledbetter's argument
that the Court should find that she endured discriminatory pay
resulting from prior, but ongoing, discrete discriminatory acts with
a present effect. 190 Instead, the Court adopted the position that
disparate pay may be accomplished through the employer's past
discriminatory and discrete acts, about which acts the employee
must timely complain or the employee will lose access to the
courts. 191 The Court declined to adopt a rule articulating that pay
claims are somehow special and should be analogized to hostile
192
environment claims.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 19-22.
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2172-73.
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1184.
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2174.

187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting Lorance, 490 U.S. at 911) (internal quotations omitted).
Bazemore involved a pay rate premised on the division of employees between a
"white" and a "negro" employment structure.
478 U.S. at 390-91. The
distinction between a facially neutral pay system and a pay system that is
facially discriminatory raises the issue of whether an employer that employs
discriminatory agents, for example, agents who pay workers less due to the
workers' sex, are somehow appreciably different than employers who institute
discriminatory pay schemes that are not identifiably the work of a particular
agent, but are nonetheless the product of an illegal employment act. This also
raises the issue of whether any employer would be so ruthless or so
unintelligent as to use a facially discriminatory pay system.
189. 127 S. Ct. at 2174. But see Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998),
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Pa. State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (each discussing the employer's liability for
discriminatory conduct by the employer's supervisor, an agent of the
employer).
190. 127 S. Ct. at 2174.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2175-76.
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Before moving to a discussion of the dissent, one additional
case, identified by the Ledbetter Court, should be addressed:
93
Machinists v. NLRB.1
6. Local Lodge No. 1424, etc., et al. v. National Labor Relations
194
Board (Machinists)
In Machinists, several unions were involved in actions under
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").195
The claims
pertained to a variety of issues, including the right to organize and
19
the administration of collective bargaining agreements. 6
Previous proceedings had held that the actions were timely filed
under Section 10(b) of the NLRA,197 which, like Title VII, provided
a 180-day window for filing complaints based on an unfair labor
198
practice.
More specifically in Machinists, a union security clause,
contained in the relevant collective bargaining agreement,
required all employees to join the union once they were hired. 199
Union security clauses are enforceable when the union represents
a majority of the workers covered by the collective bargaining
agreement. 200 If the union does not represent a majority of
workers, the union security clause is an unfair labor practice and
is unlawful under the NLRA.201 The National Labor Relations
Board (the "Board") filed charges for violation of the NLRA, and
the claim in Machinists ultimately concerned whether inclusion of
the clause was a present violation of the NLRA when the union did
not represent a majority of the workers when the clause was

193. Id. at 2177.
194. 362 U.S. 411 (1960).

195. Id. at 411-13; 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (Section 7 of the NLRA); 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (2000) (Section 8 of the NLRA).
196. Machinists,362 U.S. at 412.
197. Id. at 414.
198. Id. at 412; 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000).
199. 362 U.S. at 412.
200. Id. at 413-14.
201. Id. Although the union subsequently did represent a majority of the
employer's workforce, the NLRB characterized the original inclusion in the
security clause as an ongoing violation, despite the change in status to
majority representation. Id. at 415. At the time of the Court's consideration
of the case, the clause was not invalid. The dissent in the Board's prior ruling
119 NLRB 502 (1957) stated:
the circumstances which cause the appeal to be invalid existed only at
the point in time in the past when the agreement was executed and are
not thereafter repeated. For this reason, therefore, the continuing
invalidity of the agreement is directly related to and is based solely on
its initial invalidity, and has no continuing independent basis.
362 U.S. at 423; 119 NLRB at 516.
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originally included, but the union subsequently did represent a
20 2
majority of the workers.
The Board had held that the claim was not time-barred; the
clause represented a continuing violation, owing to the collective
bargaining agreement's ongoing enforcement. 203 On appeal, the
D.C. Circuit affirmed that the suit was timely. 204 In the Supreme
Court, the unions argued that the inclusion of the clause was a
discrete unfair labor practice, and, since the security clause was
now lawfully contained within the current collective bargaining
205
agreement, there was no present violation.
The Machinists Court parsed two types of claims under the
relevant time limitations found in the NLRA:
The first is one, where occurrences within the six-month limitations
period in and of themselves may constitute as a substantive matter,
unfair labor practices. There, earlier events may be utilized to shed
light on the true character of matters occurring within the
limitations period; and for that purpose [the NLRA] ordinarily does
not bar such evidentiary use of anterior events.
The second situation is that where conduct occurring within the
limitations period can be charged to be an unfair labor practice only
through reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice. There the use
of the earlier unfair labor practice is not merely "evidentiary," since
it does not simply lay bare a putative current unfair labor practice.
Rather, it serves to cloak with illegality that which is otherwise
lawful. And where a complaint based upon that earlier event is
time-barred, to permit the event itself to be so used in effect results
20 6
in reviving a legally defunct unfair labor practice.
The Machinists Court noted the importance of considering
probative evidence that may have occurred outside the six-month
period to determine the validity of conduct within the statute of
limitations even if standing alone it could not form the basis of a
claim. 20 7 In Machinists, the principle did not apply, because the
entire basis for the unfair labor claim was the lack of majority
status at the time the collective bargaining agreement was signed,
208
and this action was beyond the limitations period.
Notwithstanding the Board's characterization of invalid security
clauses as ongoing violations, the current workforce was covered
validly by a collective bargaining agreement containing a security

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 414; 264 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
362 U.S. at 415.
Id. at 416-17.
Id. at 417.
Id.
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clause, and the union indeed currently represented a majority of
20 9
the workers.
The Machinists Court declined to characterize the presence of
the security clause as a continuing violation: "In any real sense...
the complaints in this case are 'based upon' the unlawful execution
of the agreement, for its enforcement, though continuing, is a
continuing violation solely by reason of circumstances existing
only at the date of execution." 210 The Board previously held:
The maintaining of such an agreement in force is a continuing
violation of the Act, and the 'majority status' of the union at any
subsequent date-including the date of execution of any renewals of
the original agreement-is immaterial, for it is presumed that
subsequent acquisition of a majority status is attributable to the
211
earlier unlawful assistance received from the original agreement.
The Machinists Court disagreed and reversed the Board's
decision, holding that the unfair labor charges regarding the union
21 2
security clause were time barred.
Referencing its Machinists holding, the Ledbetter Court
repeated the language in Machinists,stating:
where conduct occurring within the limitations period can be
charged to be an unfair labor practice only through reliance on an
earlier unfair labor practice[,]the use of the earlier unfair labor
practice [merely] serves to cloak with illegality that which was
otherwise lawful." This interpretation corresponds closely to our
analysis in Evans and Ricks and supports our holding in the present
case.213

The Court had thus completed its analysis of the key cases
that the majority identified as a bar to Lilly Ledbetter's filing. If
the Court could distinguish Morgan and Bazemore, and it would
not permit a timely charge in Evans, Ricks, Lorance or Machinists,
214
Ledbetter could not sue.
7. The Court's Response to Two Additional Aspects of the Case
Completing this review's examination of the majority opinion,
the Ledbetter Court wrestled with two additional issues in the
case. First, the Ledbetter Court analyzed statutes of limitations in
general, stating that they "represent a pervasive legislative
209. Id. at 412, 423.
210. See id. at 423 (agreeing with the Board's dissent (119 NLRB 502, 516
(1957))). The application of the contract was legal, since the union then
represented a majority of the workers. Id. at 414.

211. Id.
212. Id. at 414-15.
213. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2177 (quoting 362 U.S. 411, 416-17).
214. None of the decisions that the majority cited as controlling, Morgan,
Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Machinists, specifically dealt with discriminatory
pay. Bazemore did address pay and allowed the plaintiffs' claims.
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judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to
defend within a specified period of time and that 'the right to be
free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
prosecute them."' 215 Specifically addressing the time limitations in
Title VII, the Court quoted Ricks, stating that the EEOC deadline
"protects employers from the burden of defending claims arising
from employment decisions that are long past[,]" 216 and "by
choosing obviously short deadlines, Congress clearly intended to
encourage the prompt processing of all charges of employment
2 7
discrimination." 1
Second, the Court refused to consider the policy reasons
offered by Ledbetter that might allow discriminatory pay to be
treated differently than other types of discriminatory conduct,
such as a termination, particularly in regard to the time
requirements applicable to various forms of discrimination. 218 The
Ledbetter dissent argued that discriminatory pay is different from
discrete discriminatory acts, because, by its nature, pay is ongoing,
so that discriminatory pay claims resemble the facts implicated in
suits that allege a hostile work environment.
The dissent
indicated that the time requirements should be different for
different types of claims; 219 pay discrepancies are cumulative, as
are the discriminatory actions endured in a hostile environment,
and, furthermore, pay discrepancies may be more difficult to
detect than a discrete act, as small differences only become
detectable over time. 220 To the extent, in the majority's analysis,
that precedent deviated from the Court's treatment of pay as a
discrete act, the Court refused to agree.
B. Justice Ginsburg'sDissent
Justice Ginsburg began her dissent by noting the difference
between a claim generally involving discriminatory employment
actions and a claim alleging discriminatory pay:
Pay disparities are. . . significantly different from adverse actions
"such as termination, failure to promote... or refusal to hire," all
involving fully communicated discrete acts, "easy to identify" as
discriminatory. It is only when the disparity becomes apparent and
sizable, e.g., through future raises calculated as a percentage of
current salaries, that an employee in Ledbetter's situation is likely

215. 127 S. Ct. at 2170 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117
(1979) (some internal quotations omitted)).
216. Id. (quoting Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256-57).
217. Id. (quoting Mohasco Corp v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980)).
218. Id. The Morgan Court had previously distinguished different time
limitations under Title VII for allegations of discrete discriminatory acts and

for a hostile environment. 536 U.S. at 118.
219. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181.
220. Id. at 2182.
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to comprehend her plight and, therefore, to complain. Her initial
readiness to give her employer the benefit of the doubt should not
preclude her from later challenging the then current and continuing
221
payment of a wage depressed on account of her sex.
According to Justice Ginsburg, the manner in which the
majority treated Ledbetter's claim characterizes actionable
discrimination in compensation as actions that are "discrete from
prior and subsequent decisions" 222 rather than the alternate view
that would count "both the pay-setting decision and the actual
223
payment of a discriminatory wage as unlawful practices."
Contrary to the majority's analysis, and because "[i]t is not
unusual.., for management to decline to publish employee pay
levels, or for employers to keep private their own salaries,"
employees in circumstances like Ledbetter's cannot file a claim
about a discriminatory act about which, for perhaps years, they
did not know. 224 Goodyear's confidentiality policy regarding pay
ensured that workers were generally unaware of their coworkers'
compensation, and employees may only become aware after the
225
180-day limitation has expired.
The dissent would classify discriminatory pay as a form of
discrimination that more closely resembled a hostile environment
case, with a harm (in this case the discriminatory pay) that was
226
ongoing in nature, rather than a discrete act of discrimination.
The claim "rested not on one particular paycheck, but on the
'cumulative effect of individual acts."' 227 As Justice Ginsburg
stated:
The problem of concealed pay discrimination is particularly acute
where the disparity arises not because the female employee is flatly
denied a raise but because male counterparts are given larger
raises. Having received a pay increase, the female employee is
unlikely to discern at once that she has experienced an adverse
employment decision. She may have little reason even to suspect

221. Id. at 2178-79 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114).
222. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2179.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2182. In footnote three of the dissent, Ginsburg quotes Bierman
and Gely's review: "one-third of private sector employers have adopted specific
rules prohibiting employees from discussing their wages with coworkers; only
one in ten employers have adopted a pay openness policy." Leonard Bierman
& Rafael Gely, Love, Sex and Politics?Sure. Salary?No Way: Workplace Social
Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168, 171 (2004).
225. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181-82; see also supra note 25 (concerning the
anonymous note that Ledbetter received, through which she became aware of
the pay discrepancy).
226. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181.
227. Id. (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115).
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discrimination until a pattern develops incrementally and she
228
ultimately becomes aware of the disparity.
Justice Ginsburg argued that Ledbetter's claim should be
analyzed, therefore, under the approach used in cases alleging a
229
hostile work environment.
Justice Ginsburg was also puzzled by the Court's use of
Lorance in its analysis: "[t]he Court's extensive reliance on
Lorance... is perplexing for that decision is no longer effective: In
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress superseded Lorance's
holding." 230 Justice Ginsburg cited to the Senate Report that
accompanied the precursor to the 1991 amendment.2 31 The Senate
Report stated:
Where, as was alleged in Lorance, an employer adopts a rule or
decision with an unlawful discriminatory motive, each application of
that rule or decision is a new violation of the law. In Bazemore...
for example... the Supreme Court properly held that each
application of the racially motivated salary structure, i.e., each new
paycheck, constituted a distinct violation of Title VII. Section
233
7(a)(2) 232 generalizes the result correctly reached in Bazemore.
Justice Ginsburg stated that no Court had cited Lorance in
2 34
support of any decision since the 1991 amendment.
In addition, Justice Ginsburg stated that the Courts of Appeal
have "overwhelmingly judged as a present violation" 235 wage
payment that is "infected by discrimination." 236 In addition to
228. Id. at 2182; see also, L. Camille Hebert, Why Don't "Reasonable Women"
Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711 (2007) (discussing
women's responses to sexual harassing work environments).
229. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. 2182.
230. Id. at 2183.
231. Id.
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000)(codifying the amendment: "For
purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs ...when the
seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the
seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of
the seniority system or provision of the system.").
233. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2183 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1990, S.Rep.
No. 101-315 at 54 (1990)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was not accompanied
by a Senate Report, and Justice Ginsburg stated that the 1991 Act was
essentially identical to the act proposed in 1990. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2183
n.5.
234. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 2184.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2184-85. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Fed'n Employment and Guidance
Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Any paycheck given within the
[charge-filing] period ... would be actionable, even if based on a
discriminatory pay scale set up outside of the statutory period."); Shea v. Rice,
409 F.3d 448, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[An] employer commit[s] a separate
unlawful employment practice each time he pays one employee less than
another for a discriminatory reason") (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 396);
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referring to cases in the circuits, Justice Ginsburg also noted that
the EEOC has consistently held that Title VII allows employees to
challenge discriminatory pay each time it is received. 237 The
EEOC Compliance Manual also lends support to this
interpretation: "repeated occurrences of the same discriminatory
employment action, such as discriminatory paychecks, can be
challenged as long as one discriminatory act occurred within the
'238
charge filing period.
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the majority's argument
regarding the difficulty faced by employers who must defend
In cases like
employment decisions reached long ago. 239
that
concern
discriminatory
pay,
however, "the
Ledbetter's
240
discrimination of which Ledbetter complained is not long past,"
but cumulated with each paycheck. 241 According to the dissent,
the Ledbetter decision will not only affect female employees
claiming discrimination, but all groups protected by Title VII's
prohibitions against discrimination:
For example, under today's decision, if a black supervisor initially
received the same salary as his white colleagues, but annually
received smaller raises, there would be no right to sue under Title
Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 2002)
("[Bazemore] has taught a crucial distinction with respect to discriminatory
disparities in pay, establishing that a discriminatory salary is not merely a
lingering effect of past discrimination-instead it is itself a continually
recurring violation .... [E]ach race-based discriminatory salary payment
constitutes a fresh violation of Title VII." (footnote omitted)); Anderson v.
Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 335 (D.C.Cir. 1999) ("The Courts of Appeals have
repeatedly reached the ... conclusion" that pay discrimination is "actionable
upon receipt of each paycheck"); Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dept. of Natural Res., 347
F.3d 1014, 1025-29 (7th Cir. 2003); Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257 (3d
Cir. 2001); Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167-68 (8th
Cir. 1995) (en banc); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 34749 (4th Cir. 1994); Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency,
785 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1986).
237. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2185.
238. Id. (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 2-IV-C(1)(a), p. 605:0024, p.
605:0024 n.183 (2006)).
The majority stated that the EEOC's prior
administrative rulings concerning Title VII's time limitations were incorrect
and it stated that the Court had previously declined to give deference to the
EEOC Compliance Manual or its adjudicatory decisions. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct.
at 2177 n.11. The Court emphasized in its explanation:
The EEOC's views in question are based on its misreading of Bazemore.
Agencies have no special claim to deference in their interpretation of our
decisions. Nor do we see reasonable ambiguity in the statute itself, which
makes no distinction between compensation and other sorts of claims and
which clearly requires that discrete employment actions alleged to be unlawful
be motivated "because of such individual's.., sex."
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2177 n.11 (internal citations omitted).
239. Id. at 2185.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2186.
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VII outside the 180-day window following each annual salary
change, however strong the cumulative evidence of discrimination
might be. The Court would thus force plaintiffs, in many cases, to
sue too soon to prevail, while cutting them off as time barred once
the pay differential is large enough to enable them to mount a

winnable case. 242
Justice Ginsburg went on to reiterate the lower court's
recognition of Ledbetter's prima facie case of sex discrimination
where Ledbetter established: "[s]he was a member of a protected
class; she performed work substantially equal to work of the
dominant class [men]; she was compensated less for that work;
and
the
disparity
was
attributable
to
gender-based
discrimination." 243 Ledbetter's pay disparity resulted from "a long
series of decisions reflecting Goodyear's pervasive discrimination
against women managers in
general and Ledbetter in
particular." 244 Justice Ginsburg's dissent presented the employer's
series of discriminatory acts in great detail, contrasting markedly
with the majority's general failure to discuss the circumstances
245
leading to the pay disparity in its own recitation of the facts.
In conclusion, Justice Ginsburg maintained "the ball is in
Congress's court. As in 1991, the Legislature may act to correct
this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII."246
IV. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' DECISIONS INVOLVING
TITLE VII AND DISCRIMINATORY PAY
The Circuit Courts of Appeal had dealt with several cases
involving claims of discriminatory pay and the time limitations
under Title VII prior to the Court's decision in Ledbetter.247 The
cases can be divided into two categories: cases that were decided
after Morgan, and cases that pre-date Morgan. The cases can be
subdivided further, distinguishing those that likely would permit
Ledbetter's suit as timely and those that would not.
As
demonstrated below, while the Ledbetter court in the Eleventh
Circuit denied Ledbetter's claim,248 it is the only court, compared
with all of the other circuits that would likely reach that result.
The circuit cases and their holdings are now analyzed in Section
242. Id. at 2186 n.9.
243. Id. at 2187.
244. Id.
245. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2178, 2181-82, 2185-88. The majority opinion's
sole reference to the facts underlying the claim of discrimination was made in
one footnote and in connection with one supervisor's actions. Id. at 2171 n.4.
246. Id. at 2188 (Justice Ginsburg referred to the 1991 Amendment of Title
VII, in response to, among other issues, the Court's decision in Lorance v.
AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989)); see infra Part VI (detailing actions
taken by Congress in response to Ledbetter).
247. See Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2178-88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
248. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1189-90.
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IV. This Section begins with the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of
Ledbetter.
A. Post-MorganDecisionsin the Circuit Courts of Appeal
1.

The Eleventh Circuit:Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber

Co, Inc.

249

The Eleventh Circuit indicated that Ledbetter had
established a prima facie case of sex discrimination by virtue of
her pay discrepancy. 250 In rebuttal, Goodyear countered that
Ledbetter received the second lowest performance ranking in her
performance review compared to other managers in the period
immediately preceding her last paycheck, supplying a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decisions regarding Ledbetter's
pay. 251 The Eleventh Circuit concluded: "[iun this case, Ledbetter
does not dispute that Goodyear came forward with legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons . . . [t]he sole issue therefore is whether
a reasonable jury could have found those reasons to be pretexts for
intentional sex discrimination. The answer is a clear 'no.' 25 2
Goodyear's explanation for the pay disparity rested on the
1998 performance review (the only employment act within the
180-day period), and Ledbetter was prohibited from introducing
evidence of discrimination prior to the 1998 review, therefore, the
court found Ledbetter's claim to be time-barred and held in favor
25 3
of Goodyear.
Title VII limits complaints to charges filed within 180 days
"after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 25 4
After repeating the plain language of the statute, the Eleventh
Circuit analyzed the Supreme Court's prior application of Title VII
time limitations in Morgan.255 The Morgan Court held that
'discrete acts of discrimination' such as 'termination, failure to
promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,"' 256 may constitute
illegal acts under the statute, but an act that precedes the

249. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d 1169.
250. Id. at 1186.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1189. Additional examples of discriminatory animus in the
workplace came from the district court, including, for example, a question
asked by a former plant manager, "When [are we] going to get rid of the drunk
and the damn woman." Id. at 1189 n.27. The Eleventh Circuit refused to
consider this evidence in connection with the denial of a pay increase in 1997
because it occurred prior to the 180-day limitation period and the court also
characterized the statement as hearsay. Id.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
255. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101.
256. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114).
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limitation period cannot provide the basis for a claim. 257 An act
that occurs prior to the limitation period may provide evidence "in
support of (the] timely claim," 258 but cannot support the claim
itself.259 More specifically, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the
difference between a hostile environment and a discrete
discriminatory act as noted in Morgan.260 When an employee
claims that he or she was subjected to a hostile work environment,
a series of discriminatory acts, even those falling outside the
limitations period, may nonetheless suffice as the basis for a claim
under Title V11 261 "so long as an act contributing to that hostile
262
environment takes place within the statutory time period."
Echoing Morgan, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the hostile
work environment from a discrete act of employment
discrimination, stating that, for a hostile work environment claim:
[t]heir very nature involves repeated conduct. The "unlawful
employment practice" therefore cannot be said to occur on any
particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years, and,
in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may
not be actionable on its own. Such claims are based on the
2 63
cumulative effect of individual acts.
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted Morgan as holding that a

discriminatory pay practice was a discrete discriminatory act, as
264
specified by Morgan, rather than a hostile work environment,
and, therefore, a paycheck, or a decision that establishes what is
paid, constitutes a discrete act for purposes of Title VII's time
265
limitation:
If an employee is denied a raise, given a pay cut, or hired at a
deflated pay grade because of a prohibited consideration, the statute
is violated and the employee can file suit the moment the decision is
made ...

[s]imilarly, if the act complained of is the issuance of a

discrete discriminatory paycheck (or paychecks), then the issuance
of the challenged paycheck completes the "alleged unlawful
employment practice" for purposes of the timely-filing requirement.
Pay claims do not, therefore, have those characteristics that led the
Court to devise a separate rule governing the timing of hostile work
environment claims .... The alleged discriminatory behavior need
266
not accumulate to some critical mass to become actionable.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.; Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113.
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113).
Id.
Id.
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105.
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105).
Id. (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115).
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1179.
Id. at 1179-80.
Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Ledbetter could only
claim one employment action as a platform for her Title VII claim,
specifically, the performance review and the associated decisions
establishing her pay level prior to her retirement. 267 The court
stated that to hold otherwise would allow Ledbetter to expand her
damage award and permit Ledbetter's claim to go forward even in
the absence of discriminatory intent in the 1998 performance
review:268

[W]hat Ledbetter did-what the district court allowed her to do-was
to point to the substantial disparity between her salary and those of
the male (managers) at the end of her career, put on circumstantial
evidence that persons holding control over her pay earlier in her
career had discriminatory animus toward women, show that other
female (managers) in the plant were paid less than their male coworkers, and then put the onus on Goodyear to provide a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for every dollar of difference between her
269
salary and her male co-workers' salaries.
The structure of Ledbetter's action in the district court
permitted Ledbetter to claim that each paycheck constituted a
novel and discrete act sufficient to revive her cause of action under
the statute. 270 The Eleventh Circuit responded:
Unless there is a claim that the person - or more likely, today, the
computer 271 - who actually issued the paychecks in question did so
with intent to discriminate, the operative act of discrimination will
always be, not the act of issuing paychecks, but the act of making
the underlying decision about what the plaintiff should be
paid ... there must, however, be some limit on how far back the
272
plaintiff can reach.

The district court, in the Eleventh Circuit's estimation,
inappropriately reached beyond the 180-day limitation and
incorrectly concluded that Goodyear's conduct was, by virtue of the
273
stale acts, actionably discriminatory.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Ledbetter's
interpretation of the cases that apply to claims for discriminatory

267. Id. at 1180.
268. Id. But see Reese v. Ice Cream Specialties Inc., 347 F.3d 1007, 1010-11

(7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the amount of back-pay recovery under Title VII
is limited to the limitations period imposed by the statute even though each
discriminatory paycheck could revive a claim for discrimination).
269. Id. at 1180-81.
270. Id. at 1181.
271. The Eleventh Circuit's passing reference to computer-issued paychecks
dryly assumed that the employer was not making or reviewing pay decisions,
and there was no computer programmer who carried out these decisions, or at
least someone turned the computer on.
272. Id. at 1182.
273. Id. at 1180.
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pay that precede Morgan.274 The court noted that, assuming the
cases survived Morgan and continued to announce good law, they
did not support Ledbetter's claim:
[TIhe cases on which Ledbetter relies hold simply that pay claims
are not time-barred if (allegedly) unlawful paychecks were issued
within the limitations period; they do not speak to how far back in
time the plaintiff may reach in looking for the intentionally
discriminatory act that is the central requisite element of every
275
successful disparate treatment claim.

The Eleventh Circuit also distinguished its prior decision in
Calloway v. Partners National Health Plans.276
Calloway
concerned an African American employee, Felicia Calloway, who
replaced an equally qualified white woman worker. 277 Calloway's
employer paid Calloway less in this same position. 278 When
Calloway resigned, she was, in turn, replaced by a less
279
credentialed white woman who was paid more than Calloway.
The Calloway court held that Calloway's claim was not timebarred, as argued by her employer, 280 stating that, "when the
claim is one for discriminatory wages, the violation exists every
single day the employee works."2 1 The employer established the
practice of discrimination when it hired Calloway, and it continued
to discriminate throughout her employment. 28 2 The Eleventh
Circuit did not find that Ledbetter was similarly situated to
Calloway in her claim; Ledbetter underwent annual reviews at
which she could have filed suit, or at least registered a complaint
regarding her pay. 2 3 Without an annual review, "Calloway
274. Id. at 1181. The court noted that in cases preceding Morgan, the
circuits generally held that a Title VII claim alleging a discriminatory pay

claim was not time barred if at least one paycheck implementing the
challenged pay rate was issued during the limitations period. Id. The preMorgan cases cited by the Eleventh Circuit included: Calloway v. Partners
NationalHealth Plans, 986 F.2d 446 (11th Cir. 1993); Cardenas v. Massey, 269
F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2001); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336
(4th Cir. 1994); Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1982); Ashley v.
Boyle's Famous Corned Beef, 66 F.3d 164 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc), abrogated
on other grounds by Morgan, 536 U.S. at 101; Gibbs v. Pierce Count Law
Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1986); Goodwin v.
General Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2002); Anderson v. Zubieta,
180 F.3d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
275. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1182.
276. 986 F.2d 446 (11th Cir. 1993).
277. Id. at 447.
278. Id.

279. Id.
280. 986 F.2d at 449.
281. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1184, (quoting Calloway, 986 F.2d at 449) (citing
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 396 n.6 (1986)).
282. Calloway, 986 F.2d at 449.

283. 421 F.3d at 1184. The court failed to mention, however, that Ledbetter
did not know about the pay discrepancy for many years. Practically speaking,
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belongs in a different category of pay-related claims and is fully
consistent with the rule we announce today."28 4 The absence of an
annual review, a process that was integrated in pay decisions for
Ledbetter, made Calloway's claims fundamentally different to the
present court.
The Eleventh Circuit, distinguishing Calloway, ultimately
dismissed Ledbetter's argument and her lawsuit, and the court
ruled in favor of Goodyear. 28 5 Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit,
the other circuit courts that heard claims for discriminatory pay
since Morgan have held that a plaintiff may file a claim for
discriminatory pay, even if the alleged conduct stretched beyond
the 180-day limitation.
2. The Second Circuit:Forsyth v. Federated Employment and
28 6
Guidance Service
The employee, Allison Forsyth, claimed violations of Title VII
for race and national origin discrimination in the employer's
award of pay and promotions. 28 7 The Second Circuit dismissed for
failure to state genuine issues of triable fact, 288 but the court
nevertheless discussed whether the action was time-barred, as
held by the district court, or timely. 28 9 Under Title VII, a plaintiff
has 300 (or 180 days depending on the state) from the time of any
alleged discriminatory conduct to file an action: 290 "Discrete
discriminatory acts are time-barred, notwithstanding the fact 'they
are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges,' if they fall
outside of the limitations period .... At the same time, each
discriminatory act starts the clock running again for purposes of
'291
filing charges alleging that act.
The Second Circuit cited Bazemore v. Friday and Pollis v.
New School for Social Research 92 as standing for the proposition
that discriminatory pay rates are not part of a continuing
violation, but instead each paycheck, standing alone, represents a
293
discrete and separable wrong:

she could not complain about facts that she did not know.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1184-85.
286. 409 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2005).
287. Id. at 566.
288. Id. at 566-67 (affirming the district court's dismissal of the suit for
failure to state genuine issues of material fact, but announcing, contrary to the
district court's opinion, that the claim itself was not time barred).
289. Id. at 572-73.
290. Id. at 572.
291. Id. (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113
(2002)).
292. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385; Pollis v. New School for Soc.
Research, 132 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1997).
293. Forsyth, 409 F.3d at 573.
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As we explained in Pollis, discriminatory pay scales... involve a
number of individual and separate wrongs rather than one course of
wrongful action. And, each repetition of wrongful conduct may, as
Morgan taught, be the basis of a separate cause of action for which
suit must be brought within the limitations period beginning with
294
its occurrence.
Morgan failed to overturn Bazemore, because "every paycheck
stemming from a discriminatory pay schedule is an actionable
discrete act," even though it involves repeated conduct." 295 By
virtue of Morgan, Title VII did not bar the suit, and, therefore, the
296
Forsyth court refused to dismiss the claim on that basis.
3.

297
The D.C. Circuit: Shea v. Rice

William Shea claimed racial discrimination in violation of
Title VII.298 Shea alleged that his non-minority status prevented
him from being assigned, in his initial posting, to a pay grade
consistent with similarly situated minority coworkers, and that his
299
subsequent salary reflected this lower starting wage.
Looking to Morgan, the D.C. Circuit stated that Morgan
eliminated the continuing violation doctrine in cases 'such as
termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to
hire,"' 30 0 and that "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable
if time-barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely
filed charges." 30 1 The court held that any discriminatory pay
received prior to the limitations period was not recoverable, and
the issue was whether the paychecks Shea received after the time
limitations nonetheless could be the subject of a claim, despite the
30 2
ruling in Morgan.
The D.C. Circuit noted a distinction between, first, a
complaint regarding one's initial assignment, which is a discrete
act by the employer, and, second, a claim for discriminatory pay
concomitant with that assignment. 303 The D.C. Circuit cited to
Evans, Ricks, and Lorance for the proposition that claims
involving discrete acts will be time-barred if filed outside the

294. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 409 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
298. Id. Shea claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination
because he was white and Irish, and his employer's diversity program
disadvantaged his racial and national origin status. Id.
299. Id. at 449-50.
300. Id. at 451 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113-114).
301. Shea, 409 F.3d at 451 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113).
302. Id. at 451-52.
303. Id.at 452-53.
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statute of limitations. 3 4 The D.C. Circuit analyzed Shea's claim
as one not based in discriminatory assignment, but rather for
discriminatory pay that resulted from the assignment, reviving his
claim with each new paycheck. 305 Shea's claim was, therefore,
more properly addressed by the Supreme Court's holding in
Bazemore, where "the Court unanimously declared that the
employer committed a separate unlawful pay practice each time he
paid one employee less than another for a discriminatory
reason." 30 6 The D.C. Circuit's previous ruling in Anderson v.
Zubieta,30 7 similarly drew the distinction between cases alleging a
discrete discriminatory act (such as unlawful termination) and a
pay system that 'continued to discriminate unlawfully each time
308
it was applied."'
The D.C. Circuit's language in Shea is particularly important;
the court analyzed Morgan and Bazemore and determined that the
two holdings actually "dovetail."309 While the employer in Shea
argued that Morgan overturned Bazemore,310 the D.C. Circuit
stated:
Not so. Granted, Morgan restricted the 'continuing violation
doctrine' in holding that, while 'a hostile work environment
claim ...will not be time barred so long as all the acts which
constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment
practice and at least one act falls within the time period,' 311 discrete
discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when
But
they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.
Bazemore survives Morgan; indeed, Morgan expressly relied on
Bazemore. In Morgan, the Court offered the Bazemore scenariopaychecks delivering less to one group of employees than another-as
an example of the type of 'discrete act' that is actionable under Title
VII .... 312 [W]hile several sister Circuits have recognized that
Morgan scuttled the continuing violation doctrine, none has
suggested that, in doing so, the Court abandoned its holding in
Bazemore.313

The D.C. Circuit went on to emphasize that:
Given the holding in Morgan relies on the holding in Bazemore, it is
difficult to see how the application of the latter could 'eviscerate' the
former.
The two decisions dovetail: Bazemore holds that an

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
(D.C.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at 452.
Id.
Id. at 452-53 (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395-96).
180 F.3d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see supra Part III.A.3.
Shea, 409 F.3d at 453 (quoting Anderson v. Zubieta 180 F.3d 329, 336
Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 455.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 453 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S at 122 (internal citation omitted)).
Id.
Id. at 453-54 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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employee may recover for discriminatory low pay received within
the limitation period because each paycheck constitutes a discrete
discriminatory act, and Morgan rejects the continuing violation
theory 'because discrete discretionary acts are not actionable if time
barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in the timely filed
314
charges.
The D.C. Circuit dismissed the lower court's ruling in favor of
315
the employer and remanded the case.
4.

The Seventh Circuit

a.

Reese v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc.

316

An African American employee, Charlie Reese, Jr., filed
317
charges against his employer, claiming pay discrimination.
Reese failed to get a pay raise that his white coworkers did
receive. 318
Reese was unaware for over three years that his
employer had implemented the pay raises. 31 9 When Reese filed
charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC, the
Commission denied his claim on the basis that it was timebarred. 320 The district court similarly held that the pay disparity
failed to constitute a continuing violation under Title VII, and
instead was a "sole discriminatory act" and found for the
32
employer. 1
The Seventh Circuit agreed that the pay structure constituted
a discrete discriminatory act "in a series of separate discrete
acts," 322 but held that the claim concerning discriminatory pay was
not barred by the time limitations, "because each check that (the
employer) paid
Reese
was potentially
a
fresh act of
discrimination." 323 The employer was, therefore, answerable to the
324
charge of employment discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Reese was consistent,
according to the Reese court, with the Third Circuit's decision in
Cardenas v. Massey, 325 in which a racially discriminatory pay

314. Shea, 409 F.3d at 455 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113) (emphasis
added) (internal citation omitted).
315. Id. at 456. The district court had initially dismissed Shea's allegations,
including his claim of discriminatory pay under Title VII, as time barred. Id.
at 450.
316. 347 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2003).
317. Id. at 1008.
318. Id. at 1009.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1010.
323. Id. at 1013.
324. Id. at 1014.
325. 629 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001); see supra Part III.A.4.a.
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structure afforded a new claim for each paycheck when the initial
pay rate was discriminatory.3 26 The Seventh Circuit also found
that its decision was consistent with Bazemore,327 which was
reaffirmed in Morgan328 because the Bazemore Court stated that
each paycheck constituted 'a wrong actionable under Title VII."'329
Noting that each paycheck constituted a new violation, the
330
Seventh Circuit quoted the Supreme Court in Florida v. Long,
in which the Court stated, "[i]n a salary case ... each week's
paycheck is compensation for work previously performed and
completed by an employee." 331 The Reese court held that pay
discrimination posed a unique circumstance amenable to the
continuing violation concept which "depend[s] on the cumulative
impact of numerous individual acts."332 The court concluded that
its approach applied the continuing violation theory consistent
with cases in the Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth and the
D.C. Circuits. 333 Despite the court's ruling that Reese might
recover, the recovery was limited to paychecks received during the
334
statutory time limitation.
b.

3 5

Hildebrandt v. Illinois Department of Natural Resources

In Hildebrandt, Reinee Hildebrandt sued her employer
claiming, among other charges, discriminatory pay. 335 While her
1993 salary as a new employee began at a comparable or higher
rate than her coworkers, 336 three years later Hildebrandt was paid
the least among similarly employed workers. 337 During the threeyear period, Hildebrandt received performance ratings that ranged
from "needs improvement" to "accomplished. '"338 Nonetheless, the
employer provided her the smallest raises among similarly rated

326. Reese, 347 F.3d at 1011.
327. Bazeman, 478 U.S. 385 (per curiam).
328. 536 U.S. at 111-12.
329. Reese, 347 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395).
330. 487 U.S. 223 (1988).
331. Reese, 347 F.3d at 1011 (quoting Long, 487 U.S. at 239.
332. Id. at 1012.
333. Id. at 1013. The Seventh Circuit cited to the following cases: Pollis v.
New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1997); Cardenas v.
Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training,Inc., 36
F.3d 336, 345-51 (4th Cir. 1994); Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66
F.3d 164, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Goodwin v. General Motors Corp.,
275 F.3d 1005, 1011 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 941; Anderson v.
Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 335-37 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
334. Reese, 347 F.3d at 1013.
335. 347 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2003).
335 Id. at 1020.
336. Id. at 1021.

337. Id.
338. Id.
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employees. 339
Hildebrandt complained about her salary disparity beginning
in 1992.340 In 1998, she filed a claim with the EEOC, followed by a
The district court dismissed
lawsuit in the district court.
claim
as
time barred. 341 Hildebrandt
Hildebrandt's Title VII
appealed, arguing that the continuing violations doctrine allowed
342
the claim against her employer to stand.
The Seventh Circuit cited Bazemore343 and Morgan344 as

establishing that disparate pay rates may support a Title VII
action involving discrete discriminatory acts. 345 The Seventh
Circuit noted, "we ... have recognized that '[d]rawing the line

between something that amounts to a 'fresh act' each day and
something that is merely a lingering effect of an earlier, distinct,
violation is not always easy."'346 Despite the difficulty, because
Hildebrandt's pay rate was related to a prior discriminatory act,
each paycheck was, in itself, a discrete occurrence, and reliance on
the continuing violation doctrine, abrogated by Morgan, was
unnecessary. 347 The paychecks were not part of a continuing
alleging
discrete
claim
and
Hildebrandt's
violation, 348
349
discriminatory conduct was, therefore, timely.
For Hildebrandt, the Seventh Circuit's ruling indicated that
only those paychecks she received within the time limitations
could support a Title VII action. 350 In a footnote, the court stated
that its decision was consistent with Reese;35 1 if the conduct that
established the discriminatory pay occurred prior to the statutory
time bar, the employee may nonetheless recover for the
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1022.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1025.
343. 478 U.S. 385 (per curiam).
344. 536 U.S. 101.
345. Hildebrandt, 347 F.3d at 1025-27.
346. Id. at 1026 (quoting Pitts v. City of Kankakee, 267 F.3d 592, 595 (7th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002)).
347. 347 F.3d at 1028. The court stated:
Morgan's foreclosure of the continuing violation doctrine for discrete
discriminatory acts clearly requires a reevaluation of our earlier
interpretation. Using Morgan as our guide, therefore, we must conclude
that each of Dr. Hildebrandt's paychecks that included discriminatory
pay was a discrete discriminatory act, not subject to the continuing
violation doctrine.

Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See Hildebrandt, 347 F.3d at 1028 n.9 (noting that the court had
reached a similar determination "with respect to Morgan's effect of
discriminatory pay claims"); see also Reese v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 347
F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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353
B. Pre-MorganDecisionsin the Circuit Courts of Appeal

The circuit courts decided the following cases prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Morgan.
1. The Second Circuit:
354
a. Pollis v. New School for Social Research

Pollis involved the claim of Adamantia Pollis, who argued
that her salary was below that of her male coworkers in violation
of the Equal Pay Act. 35 5 While the Equal Pay Act limits awards
within two or three years, depending on the willfulness of the
employer's conduct, 356 the court that first heard her case allowed
Pollis to recover for all the years in which she proved
discriminatory pay, concluding that the discriminatory paychecks
357
were a continuing violation.
The Second Circuit found, however, that successful plaintiffs
could not recover beyond the statutory time limitations. 35 Noting
that an employee like Pollis may be uncomfortable in asserting a
claim, even as he or she currently works for the allegedly
discriminatory employer, this "is not a sufficient reason to exempt
359
[the employee] from the statute of limitations."
Stating that each paycheck constituted a discrete
discriminatory act, the Second Circuit held that the time period for
filing under the statute began anew with each payment. 360
Recovery would be limited to any pay disparity that occurred

352. Hildebrandt, 347 F.3d at 1028.
353. The Eleventh Circuit believed that, to the extent these cases continued
to stand for good law since Morgan:
[T]he cases.., hold simply that pay claims are not time-barred if
(allegedly) unlawful paychecks were issued within the limitations
period; they do not speak to how far back in time the plaintiff may reach
in looking for the intentionally discriminatory act that is the central,
requisite element of every successful disparate treatment claim.
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1182; see supra Section III.A.
The Supreme Court in Ledbetter similarly found that the pre-Morgan
decisions were unpersuasive. 127 S. Ct. at 2166. The majority did not discuss
any of the pre-Morgan circuit decisions, nor did the majority discuss the postMorgan circuit decisions that referenced Morgan (providing only a citing
reference to Forsyth and Shea. Id.
354. 132 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1997).
355. Id. at 117-18; see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
356. Pollis, 132 F.3d at 118; see also 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1988).
357. Pollis, 132 F.3d at 118.
358. Id. at 119.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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within the statutory period: 361 "[w]ith this holding, we join the
other circuits to have considered the issue, which have
unanimously adopted the reasoning of Bazemore and concluded
Pay Act for
that back pay cannot be recovered under the Equal
362
salary differentials outside the limitations period."'
The Second Circuit went on to cite several cases as all
reaching the same conclusion regarding discriminatory pay
363
practices.
b.

364
Connolly v. McCall

While Connolly addressed discrimination in connection with
eligibility for pension benefits and associated New York State law,
and does not specifically concern discriminatory pay, 365 it concerns
a similar type of ongoing violation to that raised in Ledbetter. The
lower court dismissed the plaintiffs action in Connolly as timebarred under the appropriate statutory time limitations. 366 The
Second Circuit noted that the pension claim "is most analogous to
those involving the repeated application of a discriminatory
The court, thereby, categorized Connolly as
policy."'367
appropriately being controlled by cases such as Bazemore368:
361. Id. The Second Circuit also referenced two reviews to support its
contention that a claim for discriminatory pay is not a continuing violation but
See Harvard Law Review Association,
a series of individual wrongs.
Developments in the Law-Statute of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1205
(1950) ("each continuation or repetition of the wrongful conduct may be
regarded as a separate cause of action for which suit must be brought within
the period beginning with its occurrence"); see also Douglas Laycock,
Continuing Violations, DisparateImpact in Compensation, and Other Title VII
Issues, 49-Aut LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 60 (1986)(stating:

pay discrimination is a continuing violation. Every pay period, the
plaintiff performs new services and gets a new paycheck. If that
paycheck is reduced because of race or sex, that is a new act of
discrimination. A plaintiff should be able to file a charge at any time,
recover back pay for the last 180 days, and obtain an injunction against
future violations.)
Pollis, 132 F.3d at 119.
362. Pollis, 132 F.3d at 119.
363. The Second Circuit cited to the following cases: Gandy v. Sullivan
County, 24 F.3d 861, 865 (6th Cir. 1994); Ashley v. Boyles Famous Corned Beef
Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168 (8th Cir. 1995); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes TrainingInc., 36
F.3d 336, 351 (4th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. McCarthy, 768 F.2d 1, 3 n.4 (1st Cir.
1985).
364. 254 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2001).
365. Id. at 39.
366. Id. at 40. Some of Connolly's claims were brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (in tandem with the New York Retirement and Social Security Law),
which were governed by New York's three-year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions. Id. at 40-41.
367. Id. at 41.
368. See 478 U.S. at 395-96 ("[e]ach week's paycheck that delivers less to a
black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII,
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When a plaintiff challenges a policy that gives rise over time to a
series of allegedly unlawful acts, it will often be the case that
plaintiff might bring his claim after the first such act, and yet the
law may render timely a claim brought prior to the expiration of the
36 9
statute of limitations on the last such act.
The Second Circuit's discussion of timely filing was, however,
largely made in dicta, because the court went on to rule that the
case would be dismissed on the merits. 370 If the action was
appropriately filed and was then categorized within a continuing
violation framework, the court held that the law would not bar the
371
claim as stale.
2.

372
The Third Circuit: Cardenas v. Massey

Gerard Cardenas claimed that he was subjected to racially
motivated disparate pay in violation of Title VII, dating back to
the moment of his hire and extending through the six years of his
employment. 373 The Third Circuit held that Cardenas made a
timely claim under Title VII, even if the disparate pay claim
stemmed from his initial paycheck. 374 The Third Circuit stated
that the Bazemore375 decision required such a result. 376
The
employer's reliance on three other Supreme Court decisions,
specifically Lorance,377 Ricks, 378 and Evans,379 applied to discrete
discriminatory acts outside the limitations period, 380 "[h]owever,
this line of cases does not bar claims based on conduct which is
alleged to have 'continued to discriminate unlawfully each time it
381
was applied."'
3.

382
The Fourth Circuit:Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc.

Sharon Brinkley-Obu claimed that her employer violated the
Equal Pay Act 383 and Title VII when her employer discriminated

regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of
Title VII").
369. Connolly, 254 F.3d at 41.
370. Id. at 42.
371. Id.
372. 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001).
373. Id. at 253-54.
374. Id. at 256.
375. 478 U.S. 385 (per curiam).
376. Cardenas,269 F.3d at 257.
377. 490 U.S. 900, rev'd by Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 112.
378. 449 U.S. 250.
379. 431 U.S. 553.
380. Cardenas,269 F.3d at 256.
381. Id. at 257 (quoting Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 336 (D.C. Cir.
1999)).
382. 36 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 1994).
383. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
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against her through its pay practices and employment structure. 38 4
Brinkley-Obu faced many difficulties over the years she was
employed: she was hired at a lower grade than her education or
experience would have indicated for similar workers, 385 and she
progressed "fairly rapidly as far as titles and responsibilities were
concerned," but her salary remained relatively low due to her
initial posting. 386 Brinkley-Obu's troubles continued as, prior to
her maternity leave, the employer hired a subordinate at a higher
pay than she earned. 38 7 The subordinate assumed many of the
Brinkley-Obu's former responsibilities, and, when she returned
from her leave, Brinkley-Obu was told that she must report to
him. 38 8 Brinkley-Obu complained about the pay discrepancy and
did not receive a raise, yet she continued to receive less pay "for
doing substantially equal work" throughout her employment,
38 9
compared to male coworkers.
Brinkley-Obu sued and received $27,639 of back pay for her
Equal Pay Act claim and $10,000 on her Title VII claim. 390 The
employer appealed, 391 arguing that Brinkley-Obu's lawsuit was
barred by the respective statute of limitations under the Equal
Pay Act 392 and Title VII. 393
The time limitations establish
windows for filing suit consisting of two years, under the Equal
Pay Act, and 180 days, under Title V11. 39 4 Both statutes require
that the time limitation begin to run when the discriminatory
395
conduct occurs.
At issue in Brinkley-Obu was whether the employee could
present evidence regarding the unequal pay that included
comparisons with former workers who no longer worked for the
396
employer and who had left prior to the statutory period.
Brinkley-Obu established the discriminatory pay practices in
concert with the continuing violations doctrine, 397 but the
employer argued that she could not prove a disparity based on
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 338-41.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 339.
29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1988).
Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 345; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988).
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 345; see also Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e);

Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
396. Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 345.
397. Id. at 347. The Fourth Circuit cited to Nealon v. Stone, as establishing
that "the continuing violations theory applies to both the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII claims." Id. at 347 (quoting Nealon v. Stone 958 F.2d 584, 590 n.4
(4th Cir. 1992)).
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evidence that it considered stale. 398 Nonetheless, the Fourth
Circuit stated that: "[s]tatutes of limitations do not operate as an
evidentiary bar controlling the evidence admissible at the trial of a
timely-filed cause of action. . . the statute of limitations does not
operate to limit the evidence Brinkley-Obu may introduce
regarding her co-workers." 399 The court also noted that, even if
there was no bar for the evidence presented, Brinkley-Obu could
400
only recover damages within the statutory time period.
In Brinkley-Obu the Fourth Circuit relied on Bazemore40 1 as
establishing the law relevant to pay discrimination, 40 2 and pointed
to the Fourth Circuit's prior cases dealing with the continuing
violations doctrine: 40 3 "each instance of a paycheck to a female
employee at a lower wage than that issued to her male counterpart
constitutes a new discriminatory action for purposes of the Equal
Pay Act limitations accrual .... 'This continuing violation theory
is equally applicable to Title VII." ' 4 04 The important date under
the statute of limitations for either statute is when the plaintiffs
injury occurred. 40 5 Under the court's analysis, the continuing
violation theory established that "each and every refusal to pay a
plaintiffs salary equal to that of a similarly situated male" may
violate the statutes. 408 As the court stated, the question is,
"[d]uring the statutory time period, [was the plaintiff] being paid
407
less on account of her sex?"
The court found for Brinkley-Obu, noting in dicta that while
it would not order prospective relief that adjusted Brinkley-Obu's
future salary, the employer could face new discrimination charges
40 8
if it failed to voluntarily make the adjustment.
4.

The Sixth Circuit

a.

40 9
Gandy v. Sullivan County

Rosemarie Gandy successfully sued her employer when the

398. Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 346.
399. Id.
400. Id. at n.22.
401. 478 U.S. st 395-96.
402. Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 347.
403. Id. (citing Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 n.4 (4th Cir. 1992);
Brewster v. Barnes, 758 F.2d 985, 993 (4th Cir. 1986); Jenkins v. Home Ins.
Co., 635 F.2d 310, 312 (4th Cir. 1980)).
404. Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 347 (quoting Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d at 590
n.4 (4th Cir. 1992)).
405. Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 350.
406. Id. at 350-51 (citing Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 993 (4th Cir.
1986).
407. Id. at 351.
408. Id. at 357.
409. 24 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 1994).
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district court held that her employer had paid her less than the
411
male who preceded her 410 in violation of the Equal Pay Act.
Gandy's employer argued on appeal that her lawsuit was barred
by the Equal Pay Act, which requires that the conduct underlying
the claim must occur within three years of a lawsuit filed when the
illegal conduct is willful. 412 The court stated that, '[i]t is no
defense that the unequal payments began prior to the statutory
period'.., the Equal Pay Act is violated each time an employer
41 3
presents an 'unequal' paycheck to an employee for equal work."
If only one paycheck that is tainted by discrimination is received
41 4
within the time limitations, the claim is timely.
While recognizing the doctrine of a continuing violation, the
Sixth Circuit said that it was unnecessary to identify Gandy's
claim as being within the doctrine, because the acts of which she
complained clearly occurred within the statutory time limits, and
the damages she sought were similarly limited to unequal
415
payments made within the statutory time frame.
b.

416
Hall v. Ledex, Inc.

Joy Hall received significantly less pay for substantially the
same work as the male predecessor in her position. 417 Despite two
additional evaluations of her pay grade, her salary was not
increased. 418
After Hall successfully sued her employer for
discriminatory pay in the district court, the employer appealed the
lower court's finding that the employer had discriminated against
Hall under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, and the employer also
appealed the lower court's order that Hall's pay be adjusted to
419
redress the discrimination.
The employer argued that Hall's claim was barred by the
statute of limitations. 420 The Sixth Circuit disagreed, stating that,
"the discrimination was continuing in nature. Hall suffered a
denial of equal pay with each check she received." 421 The Sixth
422
Eighth, 423 and D.C.424
Circuit cited cases from the Sixth,

410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

Id. at 863.
29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1988).
Gandy, 24 F.3d at 863.
Id. at 864 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13 (b)(5) (1981)).
Gandy, 24 F.3d at 864.
Id.
669 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 398. The employer's Personnel Director testified at trial that Hall

"later assumed more duties" than her predecessor. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. The case arose in Ohio, a deferral state that requires filing under
Title VII within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct. Id.

421. Id.
422. Hodgson v. Square D Co., 459 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
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Circuits as all supporting the court's analysis. 425 In the cases
relied upon by the employer, 426 the discriminatory acts involved
either "discharged employees [who] waited too long after
discriminatory terminations to complain," or "a decision to deny
tenure," all of which constituted discrete events rather than an
action claiming discriminatory pay. 427 As discussed in Hall, the
employees in these prior cases waited too long to file charges to
428
trigger liability - Hall did not.
5. The Eighth Circuit:Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef
429
Company
The employee, Barbara Ashley, worked for her employer for
seven years before being laid off, and sued for sex discrimination
in her pay in violation of both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act,
among other claims. 430 The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower
4 31
court's prior dismissal of the suit.
Ashley's case rested on her categorization at work as a nonunion worker. 432 Ashley was paid significantly less than male
coworkers holding unionized jobs (all of whom were male), who
performed essentially the same job as Ashley and her female, non433
union coworkers, albeit in a different unit of the company.
The Eighth Circuit first analyzed whether the employee's
claims were time-barred under Title VII. 434
The court
distinguished between Ashley's claim for discrimination based on
job assignment (to a lower-paying, non-union job) and her clam for
pay discrimination. 435 Since her initial appointment was made
seven years before Ashley's lawsuit was filed, the claim for
U.S. 967 (1972).
423. Satz v. I.T.T. Fin. Corp., 619 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1980).
424. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
425. Hall, 669 F.2d at 398-99.
426. The Sixth Circuit referred to the employer's reliance on Mohasco Corp.
v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980), Ricks v. Delaware State College, 605 F.2d 710
(3d Cir. 1979), rev'd 449 U.S. 250 (1980), "and other cases." Id. at 399.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. 66 F.3d 164 (8th Cir. 1995).
430. Id. at 166.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. The Eighth Circuit also stated that workers in both the union and
non-union units flowed between each unit as demand fluctuated and the need
arose to make temporary assignments. Id. The non-union workers were also
the first to be laid off when demand lagged. Id. The non-union workers asked
to become part of the collective bargaining unit, but were unsuccessful,
apparently owing to inaction by both the employer and the union. Id.
434. Id. at 167. The 300 day limitation period applied in this case. Id.; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
435. Ashley, 66 F.3d at 167.
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discriminatory assignment was time barred; 'the initial job
assignment, like a hiring decision, in no respect constitutes a
continuing violation.' ' 436
The assignment was, therefore, a
discrete discriminatory act subject to the time limitations of Title
VII. 437 The pay discrimination claim was, however, still viable
because: "[w]hen an employer is accused of an ongoing practice
that began prior to the statute of limitations period, the claim may
nonetheless be timely filed under the 'continuing violations
doctrine' ..... '[T]he critical question is whether a present violation
exists. "'438

Because each discriminatory paycheck may establish a new
wrong under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, Ashley's claim was
not time-barred. 439 Ashley could, therefore, recover for the
differences in pay during the limitations period. 440 As noted by
the court, "[r]elief back to the beginning of the limitations period
strikes a reasonable balance between permitting redress of an
ongoing wrong and imposing liability for conduct long past. 4 4'
6. The Ninth Circuit:Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement
442
Support Agency, City of Tacoma
Five female plaintiffs successfully sued several public
agencies (the "employer") for discriminatory pay practices in
violation of Title V11. 44 3 On appeal, the employer claimed that the
plaintiffs' suits were time barred, because "[p]laintiffs' current
salaries ...

are merely the present effect of an act - the decision to

hire plaintiffs at a given salary - that took place more than 180
days prior to the filing of plaintiffs' charge with the EEOC. '44
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the relevant
discriminatory act was the discriminatory pay: "[t]he policy of
paying lower wages to female employees on each payday
constitutes a 'continuing violation,' ' 44 5 and, therefore, the
446
plaintiffs actions were timely.

436. Id. (quoting Heymann v. Tetra Plastics Corp., 640 F.2d 115, 120 (8th
Cir. 1981)).
437. Id.
438. Id. at 167-68 (quoting United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558
(1977) (internal citations omitted)).
439. Ashley, 66 F.3d at 168.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. 785 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1986).
443. Id. at 1398. The employees' union filed on the employees' behalf. Id.
444. Id. at 1399.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 1400.
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7. The Tenth Circuit:Goodwin v. General Motors Corp. 447
Pamela Goodwin sued her employer for race discrimination,
alleging that it paid her substantially less than white workers who
performed similar jobs because she was African American. 448 The
Tenth Circuit drew attention to the fact that the employer's
confidentiality policy regarding salaries prevented employees from
knowing other workers' salaries, and the difficulty this would pose
for workers claiming pay discrimination. 449 Goodwin filed charges
under Title VII when someone anonymously gave Goodwin a list of
45 0
her coworkers' salaries.
The Tenth Circuit understood prior case law as requiring that
discrete discriminatory acts be treated differently than pay
451
discrimination:
Bazemore v. Friday452 has taught a crucial distinction with respect
to discriminatory disparities in pay, establishing that a
discriminatory salary is not merely a lingering effect of past
discrimination

-

instead

it is itself

a continually

recurring

violation ....453 Under Bazemore, then, pay discrimination must be
viewed as a continually recurring series of violations, each of which
454
is separately actionable under Title VII.

The Tenth Circuit cited several other circuit courts as
following this interpretation of pay discrimination, 455 stating,
"[t]oday we join those circuits and the Supreme Court in
recognizing that each race-based discriminatory salary payment
'456
constitutes a fresh violation of Title VI.

447. 375 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2002)
448. Id. at 1007.
449. Id. at 1008.
450. Id. Goodwin also refused, on three occasions, to sign an agreement
proffered by the employer that would have given Goodwin some of the raise
she wanted, but required her acknowledgement, on at least two occasions,
"that she had received all of the compensation due her." Id. at 1009.
451. Id.

452. 478 U.S. at 395.
453. Goodwin, 375 F.3d at 1009.
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit
characterized its own ruling, drawn from Bazemore, as echoing a unanimous
opinion of the Supreme Court, but, as also acknowledged by the Tenth Circuit,
Bazemore was a per curium opinion. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 386-88. Goodwin
drew solely from the per curium opinion, rather than Bazemore's associated
concurring opinions. Goodwin, 375 F.3d at 1010 n.5.
454. Goodwin, 375 F.3d at 1010.
455. Id. The Tenth Circuit cited to the following cases: Pollis v. New School
for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1997); Cardenas v. Massey, 269
F.3d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 2001); Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 534 (7th
Cir. 1996); Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168 (8th
Cir. 1995) (en banc); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 347
(4th Cir. 1994); and Calloway v. Partners Nat'l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446,
448-49 (11th Cir. 1993).
456. Goodwin, 375 F.3d at 1010.
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In the opinion of the Tenth Circuit, the cases on which the
employer relied in its arguments generally failed to involve fact
patterns similar to the controversy at issue in Goodwin, which
concerned discriminatory pay. 45 7 The only case cited by the
employer that did involve pay, Dasgupta v. University of
Wisconsin,458 was not applicable to Goodwin, since, according to
the Tenth Circuit, Dasgupta failed to identify why the allegedly
lower pay was not a "recurring violation,"459 which placed
Dasgupta at odds with Bazemore:460 "[n]o other circuit has
discerned the fine-line 'distinction' perceived by the Seventh
Circuit in Dasgupta, and we find any such approach unpersuasive
here."461 Another case cited by the employer, Amro v. Boeing
Co. ,462 similarly failed to hold that the discriminatory pay was part
of a continuing violation, but owed this conclusion to the district
court's opinion that the original salary was not the product of
discriminatory intent. 463 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit repeated
the lower court's finding that Goodwin could not have found out
464
about the pay disparity owing to the confidentiality policy.
Referring to the lower court's decision in favor of the employer, the
Tenth Circuit said, "[i]t makes no sense to suggest that Goodwin
should or even could have filed her complaint before she knew
about any adverse decisions." 465 Goodwin was successful, but her
466
relief was limited to back pay within the statutory time period.
8. The Eleventh Circuit: Calloway v. Partners National Health
467
Plans
Felicia Calloway claimed pay discrimination in violation of
Title VII.468 Calloway's suit alleged that white male employees
were paid more than she, an African American female. 469 The
district court dismissed her suit as time-barred, ruling that the
discriminatory pay was a discrete act that started the time
limitations under Title VII to run when she began working for the
471
employer. 470 Calloway appealed.

457. Id.
458. 121 F.3d 1138 (7th Cir. 1997).
459. Goodwin, 375 F.3d at 1010.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 1011.
462. 65 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Kan. 1999).
463. Goodwin, 375 F.3d at 1011.
464. Id.
465. Id. at n.6.
466. Id. at 1011.
467. 986 F.2d 446 (11th Cir. 1993).
468. Id. at 447; see also supra Section IV (detailing the Eleventh Circuit's
treatment of Calloway in its Ledbetter decision).
469. Calloway, 986 F.2d at 447.
470. Id. at 448.
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The Eleventh Circuit considered, "[a]s the Supreme Court
emphasized in Evans,472 'the critical question is whether any
present violation exists." ' 47 3 Finding that disparate pay was part
of a continuing violation, 474 the court held that Calloway could file
suit against her employer. 475 The court stated: "[The employer]
discriminated against Calloway not only on the day it offered her
less than her white predecessor, but also on every day of her
employment .... When the claim is one for discriminatory wages,
the violation exists every single day the employee works. 476
9.

477
The D.C. Circuit:Anderson v. Zubieta

Several Panamanians as well as Hispanic nationals claimed
discrimination in compensation based on race and national
origin. 478 The employees worked for a United States government
479
corporation, and, as such, enjoyed protection under Title VII.
480
Prior rulings dismissed the employees' actions as time-barred.
The D.C. Circuit found, however, that the employees had brought
timely claims of discrimination, which established a "continuing
violation." 48 1 The D.C. Circuit cited to Bazemore482 in support of
its ruling, as well as several circuit courts' opinions that dealt with
4s3
discriminatory pay and Title VI.
The employer argued that three Supreme Court cases
48 4
required the D.C. Circuit to dismiss the suit as time barred:
Evans,48 5 Ricks,48s and Lorance.48 7 To the contrary, the D.C.

471. Id.
472. United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
473. Calloway, 986 F.2d at 448-49 (quoting Evans, 431 U.S. at 558).
474. Calloway, 986 F.2d at 449.
475. Id. at 448-49.
476. Id.
477. 180 F.3d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
478. Id. at 333. The court noted that all the plaintiffs became United States
citizens. Id. at 332.
479. Id. at 333.
480. Id. at 334-35.
481. Id. at 335.
482. 478 U.S. at 395.
483. Anderson, 180 F.3d at 335 n.7. The D.C. Circuit cited to the following
cases: Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167-68 (8th Cir.
1995) (en banc); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 345-49
(4th Cir. 1994); Beavers v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 975 F.2d 792, 796-800
(11th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. Penton Indus. Publ'g Co., 851 F.2d 835, 838 (6th
Cir. 1988); Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d
1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986). The D.C. Circuit also cited Miller v. Beneficial
Management Corp., 977 F.2d 834, 843-44 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying the
continuing violation doctrine to unequal pay claims under the Equal Pay Act).
484. Anderson, 180 F.3d at 335.
485. 431 U.S. 553.
486. 449 U.S. 250.

487. 490 U.S. 900.

20081

DiscriminatoryPay and Title VII

Circuit found that none of those cases prevented a timely filing or
supported the employer's defense of its pay structure. 488 The facts
were distinguishable in those cases, according to the D.C. Circuit,
because Evans and Lorance concerned discriminatory seniority
systems, and Ricks involved discriminatory termination. 4 9 The
D.C. Circuit noted that the plaintiffs in Evans, Ricks, and Lorance
did not allege discriminatory pay, as was the case in Bazemore:
As Lorance explained, Bazemore was a case in which plaintiffs
contended not just that the pay system was originally adopted for
discriminatory reasons, but that it continued to discriminate
unlawfully each time it was applied. 490 "There is no doubt," Justice
Scalia said, that a system "that treats similarly
situated employees
491
differently ... can be challenged at any time.
The D.C. Circuit continued its discussion of the Supreme
Court's holdings in Evans, Ricks, and Lorance, holding that the
cases stood for the proposition that the employees in Anderson
claimed a continuing violation of a discrete act, which was
renewed with each paycheck, 492 justifying damages within the
493
statutory time period.
C. A Summary of the Circuit Court Decisions
Regarding DiscriminatoryPay
With the exception of the Eleventh, 494 the Circuit Courts of
Appeal had uniformly held in cases similar to Ledbetter that Title
VII allowed a timely claim for pay discrimination even when the
pay was the product of a discriminatory act that occurred outside
of the 180-day window established by Title VII. The Second 495 and
Third 496 Circuit rulings prior to Morgan, characterized the
discriminatory pay as a discrete and repeated discriminatory act.
The Fourth, 497 Sixth, 498 Eighth, 499 Ninth, 50 0 Tenth, 501 and
488. Anderson, 180 F.3d at 336.
489. Id.
490. Id. (summarizing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912 n.5).
491. Anderson, 180 F.3d at 336 (quoting Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912).
492. Anderson, 180 F.3d at 337.
493. Id.
494. See Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1182 (declining to find each paycheck as a
discrete discriminatory act and holding that Ledbetter could recover for
disparate pay claims only to the extent that she could show intentional
discrimination in the one decision affecting her pay scale during the
limitations period).
495. Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir.
1997); Connolly v. McCall, 254 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2001).
496. Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2001).
497. Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 349 (4th Cir. 1994).
498. Grandy v. Sullivan County, Tennessee, 24 F.3d 861, 865 (6th Cir. 1994);
Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d 397, 398-99 (6th Cir. 1982).
499. Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Company, 66 F.3.d 164, 168 (8th
Cir. 1995).
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Eleventh50 2 Circuits held pre-Morgan that the ability to timely file
the claim was a result of the continuing violations doctrine; the act
of discrimination had a continuing effect on current pay, and,
therefore, was contemporary with the claim. Post-Morgan, the
Second, 50 3 Seventh, 504 and D.C. Circuits, 5 05 held that the
discriminatory conduct was a current violation of a discrete
discriminatory act, and, therefore, posed a contemporary Title VII
violation. If Morgan drove the final nail in the continuing
violations doctrine's coffin, the Second, Seventh and D.C. Circuits
kept alive the notion of repeated discrete acts for purposes of
timely actions claiming discriminatory pay.
V. RECOGNIZING A VIOLATION HAS OCCURRED, MATERIALITY
AND THE PRACTICAL CONTEXT OF ACTIONS
CLAIMING DISCRIMINATORY PAY

This Article has examined the Ledbetter decision, the cases on
which it relied, and the circuit court decisions that dealt
previously with similar issues of discriminatory pay. Section V
now discusses the notions of materiality and the practical context
for filing a Title VII action for discriminatory pay.
A. Violation and Materiality
The Supreme Court holds that a plaintiff may establish his or
her action under Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 506 by claiming
that he or she suffered either a discrete act of discriminatory
treatment or a hostile environment premised on discrimination by
the employer. 507 "Discrete acts such as termination, failure to

500. Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency, City of
Tacoma, 785 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986).
501. Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1011 (10th Cir. 2002).
502. See Calloway v. Partners National Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 449
(11th Cir. 1993) (a decision reached prior to Ledbetter and distinguished by the
Ledbetter court in the Eleventh Circuit).
503. Forysth v. Federated Employment and Guidance Service, 409 F.3d 565,
573 (2d Cir. 2005).
504. Reese v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 347 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (7th Cir.
2003); Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep't of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1029 (7th Cir.
2003).
505. Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2005). These post-Morgan
rulings, in the Second, Seventh and D.C. Circuits, are similar to the preMorgan decisions in Second and Third Circuits.
506. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
507. See e.g., Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122; Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 73, (1986); see also, Sara L. Johnson, When is work environment
intimidating, hostile, or offensive, so as to constitute sexual harassment in
violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2000e et seq.), 78 A.L.R. FED. 252 § 2 (updated weekly, originally published
in 1986).
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promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire" 508 constitute,
therefore, one type of claim. Discrete acts must be motivated by
the employer's intent to discriminate and cause harm.50 9 The
Court has stated that these claims are "the most easily understood
type of discrimination."510 One clearly knows, for example, if one
has been fired.
The second type of claim, for a hostile environment, requires a
court to contemplate a series of acts:
Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts.
Their very nature involves repeated conduct .... The "unlawful
employment practice" therefore cannot be said to occur on any
particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and,
in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may
not be actionable on its own .... Such claims are based on the
511
cumulative effect of individual acts.

The hostile environment must reach a level of material harm
sufficient to trigger the employer's liability: 512 "complaints
attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace such as
sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes and
occasional teasing" must be filtered out by the courts. 5 13 In Oncale
v Sundowner Offshore Services,514 the Court said:
508. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
509. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Briggs. 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) ("[iun a
disparate treatment case, liability depends on whether the protected trait...
actually motivated the employer's decision.").
510. Id. at 609.
511. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115 (internal quotations omitted).
512. Another wrinkle to the hostile environment claim was raised in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, when the Court considered whether an
employer may raise an affirmative defense to discriminatory acts committed
by the employer's supervisor. 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998). The Court discussed
the notion of a tangible employment action against which the affirmative
defense cannot be raised. Id. at 761. The Court stated that tangible
employment actions included "hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
to significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits," that is, discrete, materially adverse acts. Id. The Court
extended its analysis of the issue in Pennsylvania State Police v.Suders, 542
U.S. 129, 148-50 (2004) (holding that constructive discharge is not a tangible
employment action). The Suders Court distinguished one class of hostile
environment claims from the others in order to establish when an affirmative
defense may be raised and to call attention to those cases where there exists a
discernable difference in the materiality of the harm, the precipitating factor
causing that harm, and the ability of the employee to take his or her own
action against the harm. Id. at 148. Tangible employment actions, such as a
termination, pose material harms of the first order, and the affirmative
defense is not available. Id. If the employee endures no tangible employment
action, however, the affirmative defense may be raised. Id. The significance
of the harm, as well as the ability of employees to take their own action
against it, justified the distinction in the Court's view. Id.
513. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
514. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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As we emphasized in Meritor5 15 and Harris,5 16 the statute does not
reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and
women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the
opposite sex.
The prohibition of harassment on the basis of
sex ... forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the
"conditions" of the victim's employment. "Conduct that is not severe
or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find
'5 17
hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview.

Materiality is also important to the Court when it considers
what a plaintiff must establish under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a),5 18 when he or she claims that an employer discriminatorily
retaliated against the plaintiff: 519 "We speak of material adversity
because we believe it is important to separate significant from
trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does not set forth 'a general
civility code for the American workplace.' 5 20
With regard
specifically to retaliation, the Court held:
In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materially adverse, "which in this
context means it well might have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."'

By focusing on the materiality of the challenged action and the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position, we
believe this standard will screen out trivial conduct while effectively
capturing those acts that are likely to dissuade employees from
52 1
complaining or assisting in complaints about discrimination.

515. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
516. Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
517. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (1998); (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citing
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67)).
518. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
519. See, e.g., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct.
2405, 2414 (2006) (stating that "the anti-retaliation provision protects an
individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury
or harm."). An additional question with regard to retaliation is: if an employee
asks about pay, does the employer consider questions concerning what
coworkers are paid to be a firing offense? Are terminations by the employer
only triggered when the employer operates with a specific confidentiality
policy about pay? And if the employee is fired for asking about pay, could the
employee then claim that he or she is investigating a Title VII act, and the
firing is, therefore, an illegal and discriminatory retaliation in violation of
Title VII? The difficulty posed here is that a discriminatory treatment case is
converted into a retaliation case, committed in the course of the employee's
Title VII investigation for the discriminatory treatment.
520. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80).
521. Id. at 2415-16 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C.
Cir. 2006)).
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The ability to identify an act as discriminatory and,
frequently, the ability to furthermore describe the act as a
material harm, underlie the Court's analyses of Title VII.522
When the Court classified discriminatory pay as a discrete
act, the Court eliminated the need to explicitly evaluate the act as
material, as would be the case if discriminatory pay was held to be
similar to claims for a hostile environment ("a single act of
harassment may not be actionable on its own" 523) or if the plaintiff
claimed retaliation ("we believe it is important to separate
significant from trivial harms" 524). Materiality is not important
because the focus lies on the initial act of paying the employee less
because of his or her sex, not, as would be true in a hostile
environment claim, on the ongoing consequences of that act.
Clearly, if the employee is paid less on account of sex, that act, the
moment it takes place, poses a harm. Two factors, however,
complicate the analysis for purposes of identifying a harm,
particularly a harm that is ongoing.
The first factor concerns when the employee discovers the
harm. As pointed out by Justice Ginsburg in the Ledbetter dissent,
that he or
an employee may not know, within a six-month period,
5 25
she actually is receiving less pay relative to coworkers:
The Court's insistence on immediate contest overlooks common
characteristics of pay discrimination. Pay disparities often occur, as
they did in Ledbetter's case, in small increments; cause to suspect
that discrimination is at work develops only over time. Comparative
pay information, moreover, is often hidden from the employee's
view. Employers may keep under wraps the pay differentials
maintained among supervisors, no less the reasons for those
differentials. Small initial discrepancies may not be seen as meet
[sic] for a federal case, particularly when the employee, trying to
succeed in a nontraditional environment, is averse to making

522. Id. at 2413 (discussing tangible employment actions in the context of a
retaliation case):
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, as petitioner notes, speaks of a
Title VII requirement that violations involve "tangible employment
action" such as "hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits." But Ellerth does so only to "identify a class of
[hostile work environment] cases" in which an employer should be held
vicariously liable (without an affirmative defense) for the acts of
supervisors; see also Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders (explaining
holdings in Ellerth and Faragher v. Boca Raton as dividing hostile work
environment claims into two categories, one in which the employer is
strictly liable because a tangible employment action is taken and one in
which the employer can make an affirmative defense).
White, 126 S.Ct. at 2413 (internal citations omitted).
523. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
524. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
525. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2182.
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526

Discovering that a harm exists in the first instance is
certainly important to filing the claim and asserting that one
suffered a harm as contemplated by Title VII. The employee may
discover the pay discrepancy, however, more than six months after
the initial decision to pay the employee less; under those
circumstances, the employee would be unable to file under
527
Ledbetter.
The second factor is perhaps even more critical to the
practical implications of the Ledbetter decision, and it more
obviously touches on the issue of materiality: is 180 days enough
time to generate an act of pay discrimination? For example, if a
woman is discriminatorily denied a raise, or the raise is
insubstantial in comparison to male coworkers who do receive a
relatively more generous salary increase, when does the difference
in pay become an actionable harm? A pay difference that is
relatively small may, in time, grow to become a substantial
disparity and only when the disparity is substantial will the
plaintiff realize that a violation is occurring. 528 These were the
facts essentially raised in Ledbetter, as noted by the Eleventh
Circuit:
[A]t the end of 1997, [Ledbetter] was still earning $3727 per month,
less than all fifteen of the other Area Managers in Tire Assembly.
The lowest paid male Area Manager was making $4286, roughly
15% more than Ledbetter; the highest paid was making $5236,
529
roughly 40% more than Ledbetter.

Discrete events are actionable because they are noticeably
526, Id. at 2178-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2186 n.9
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating: "[tihe Court would thus force plaintiffs, in
many cases, to sue too soon to prevail, while cutting them off as time barred
once the pay differential is large enough to enable them to mount a winnable
case").
527. Ledbetter argued that if she knew the relative raises provided to three
coworkers in only one year, her particular raise may not have prompted any
concern. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 79 at *5. "It's only if
Petitioner had all of the information... that she would have known that that
pay raise decision increased the overall disparity between her wages and the
average wages of men doing the same job." Id.
528. The focus of the pay discrepancy examples used in this Article concerns
pay discrepancies that develop as the result of raises and the pay package one
accumulates over time through those adjustments. One's compensation may
also include bonuses, which are perhaps less dependent on prior salary and
may be more isolated events. If the bonus relies on one's current salary (for
example, the bonus is a percentage of salary) or if future bonuses reference
bonuses received in the past, even bonuses may have cumulative effects. As in
the case of pay, confidentiality in the award of bonuses may present a problem
to an employee who fails to recognize that coworkers are receiving, or have
received, more of a bonus than that awarded to the employee.
529. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1174.
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and materially illegal; a termination, for example, is recognizably
illegal, that is, a material, harm. A small difference in pay may
not be recognized as an illegal pay discrepancy; employees may
suffer "a thousand cuts" before realizing they have been seriously
530
hurt.
The problem with pay decisions is that they are not, by their
nature, discrete events. A pay decision is premised on the
decisions that preceded it, including the pay rate at the initial
hire, and a pay decision is amplified over the years as salary is
earned. Justice Ginsburg noted the difficulty when she stated in
her dissent:
It is only when the disparity becomes apparent and sizable, e.g.,
through future raises calculated as a percentage of current salaries,

that an employee in Ledbetter's situation is likely to comprehend
her plight and, therefore, to complain. Her initial readiness to give
her employer the benefit of the doubt should not preclude her from
later challenging the then current and continuing payment of a
531
wage depressed on account of her sex.

If the employee must bring a claim within six months of a
discriminatory pay decision, the employee must recognize that a
530. At oral argument, Justice Scalia asked how extending the time
available to file would affect Ledbetter's claim. Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 79, at *5. Petitioner's counsel stated that it was the pay disparity
persisting for, in this case, several years that led Ledbetter to realize that the
employer committed a Title VII violation. Id. If a snapshot of pay and raises
were taken at any one point in the pay process, the disparity may not have
revealed itself as discriminatory; the cumulative effect indicated, however,
that pay was discriminatorily awarded, and the present effect was the result
of discriminatory treatment that occurred years ago. Id. at 5-6. It was only by
looking at the pay awarded over several years that the plaintiff could see the
discrimination. Id.
Ledbetter's argument would not excuse an employer who decides to pay
its employee less based on sex; that is, the employer violates Title VII at the
time of that discriminatory pay decision. The argument runs, however, that
the employee may not know of the discrimination if a pay difference is
observed at only one point in time. As the pay discrepancy builds, the plaintiff
becomes aware that the discrimination occurred. The materiality of the pay
disparity's cumulative effect is relevant here as well, since a relatively minor
difference in pay period one (i.e., when the employee's yearly salary is
determined in the employee's first year), may only reach a material difference
in pay period three (i.e., the employee's third year of employment).
Knowledge of one event, when there is one disparity in the wages
awarded, would not cause him or her to believe anything was amiss. As
argued to the Court, "[w]hen the disparity persists, when the different
treatment accrues again and again and the overall disparity in the wages
increases, that the employee has some reasonable basis to think that it's not
natural variation in the pay decisions but actually intentional discrimination."
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 79 at *6-7.
531. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2179. Ledbetter may be turning the notion of
materiality on its head, if small differences in pay (i.e., petty slights) are
enough to justify the claim.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[41:325

discrepancy exists and that the discrepancy was an act of
discrimination. 532
Assuming the employee realizes the
discrepancy exists, the Ledbetter holding necessarily implies that
the employee will furthermore classify the discrepancy as an act of
discrimination, even if the discrepancy is small compared to the
pay earned by coworkers, accruing at most over a six-month
period. Two conclusions from this Article's analysis of Ledbetter
are possible. First, if the employee must bring a claim within six
months of the initial act, the claim will be heard despite the fact
that only a small difference in pay has accrued. The depth of the
harm is irrelevant to the ability to file. Second, if only small
differences are visible within a six-month period, then the Court
may be classifying these small differences as it would the stray
discriminatory remark.5 33
A stray remark is not generally
sufficient to trigger Title VII liability. 534 Similarly, Title VII would
532. Recognizing that one is paid less is complicated due to many employers'
confidentiality policies regarding pay. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman and Rafael
Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics?Sure. Salary?No Way" Workplace Social Norms
and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167 (2004) (discussing how
employer pay secrecy / confidentiality rules run contrary to labor laws
designed to protect the rights of all employees (cited by the dissent in
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); see also Matthew A.
Edwards, The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 41 (2005) (analyzing pay secrecy rules in terms of social benefits and
the normative legal system)).
533. See, e.g., Walton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 167 F.3d 423, 426 (8th
Cir. 1999) (positing:
[S]tatements by persons involved in the decision-making process [may]
be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory
attitude.., sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that that attitude
was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's
decision... [but] not all comments that may reflect a discriminatory
attitude are sufficiently related to the adverse employment action in
question to support such an inference.)
(internal citations omitted); Krohn v. Sedgwick James of Mich., Inc., 624
N.W.2d 212, 219 (Mich. 2001) (trial court properly excluded supervisor's stray
remark as irrelevant in matter of liability of the employer); Oest v. Ill. Dep't of
Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing whether a remark
was related to the decision-making process); Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis,
Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 896-97 (5th Cir. 2002) (analysis of stray remarks under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636,
640-41 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting the difference between a remark made by a
supervisor, i.e., a decision-maker, and a comment by a coworker). See also
Robert J. Kearney, The Unintended Hostile Environment: Mapping the Limits
of Sexual HarassmentLaw, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 87, 118-19 (2004)
(neither statements made by non-decision-makers nor statements made by
decision-makers that are unrelated to the decision-making process can
constitute direct evidence of discrimination).
534. See e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (where
Justice O'Connor stated:
[S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual
harassment, cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its
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not be triggered by a small pay difference that only becomes larger
and, therefore, recognizable over time. A pay discrepancy that
grows will be ignored for purposes of Title VII, despite the ongoing
consequences of an initially small difference. The Court has,
under this alternative, eliminated the entire class of pay
discrimination claims in which small pay differences result in
large discrepancies, but only over time.
If the Court is willing to ignore the practical circumstances of
pay decisions, then the Court has essentially classified all claims
for discriminatory pay, except those claims for obvious and
recognizable and significantly different pay, as a trivial harm,
because the employee may not perceive a minor pay difference in a
six-month period as anything significant, or the employee, owing
to pay confidentiality, may not be aware of any difference at all.
B. A Hypothetical Example - The Set of Facts a Court Will
Consider in Cases Involving DiscriminatoryPay
The Ledbetter Court held that discriminatory pay was a
discrete act, which must be challenged within 180 days. 535 The
logical implications of the Court's analysis take the following form,
using a hypothetical example essentially drawn from the facts in
Ledbetter:
An employee endures discriminatory acts. The acts end and are not
repeated, and the only other evidence of discriminatory conduct is a
pervasive, but not precisely identifiable, discriminatory animus in
the workplace. Nothing indicates that the employee is being
actively and intentionally treated discriminately, as the employee is
unaware of any ongoing and actual disparity in treatment.
Nonetheless, the original discrimination forms the basis for how the
employee is treated as he or she continues to work for the employer.
Years pass, and the plaintiff finally discovers that the treatment he
or she suffered years ago laid the groundwork for a disparity to
which the employee is currently subjected.
The key aspect of the Court's understanding of the preceding
example would be that the discriminatory conduct itself was not
repeated; only the consequences of the act were felt again and
again. The Court rejected an understanding of the facts that
would disregard when the original act of discrimination occurred,
but, instead, evaluated the circumstances through the employer's
current actions, contemporaneous to the lawsuit, or at least within
180 days of it.
hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. Nor can
statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers
unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs
burden in this regard.)
(internal citation omitted).
535. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
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Continuing to draw from the example, pay decisions may be
unique in the constellation of discriminatory acts that are
currently felt, though initiated long ago. One could imagine,
however, an employee who is discriminatorily denied the
opportunity to participate in training, which then leads to the
employee being prevented from participating in subsequent job
assignments, thereby compromising the employee's ability to
obtain a promotion.
Or, the employee might have been
discriminatorily denied a work assignment, which led to a lack of
job experience, similarly causing the employee to miss future
opportunities for advancement. In either case, while he or she
may be aware of the denial, the employee is unaware of its ongoing
negative impact. The Court would hold that the employee must
file suit within the 180-day window (that is, when the training or
job assignment were denied), regardless of when or what the
employee knew regarding any ongoing impact, if the impact
536
occurred outside of the 180-day limit.
The nexus between a current negative consequence and a
prior discriminatory act would be harder to draw for cases
involving a denial of training or work assignment than would be
the case in claims for pay (as the current negative consequence),
because pay is an objectively identifiable fact of employment, and
whether, for example, the loss of a promotion was specifically
attributable to an act that happened in the past may be unclear;
that is, the act of failing to train or promote constitutes the
triggering, discriminatory act and its ongoing, enduring impact
may be difficult to establish.
If it is revealed that the worker currently is not paid as his or
her co-workers are paid, however, the fact of the ongoing
discrepancy is clearly known. The employee still has to establish
that there was discrimination with regard to pay initially. Having
established the original discrimination, the ongoing effect on pay
may be easier to relate to the past discriminatory act than would
be true in speculating that future job opportunities were foreclosed
by the employer's prior discriminatory conduct in denying a
promotion or training.
536. During the oral arguments of Ledbetter, Justice Kennedy asked
Petitioner's Counsel whether, "the rule for paycheck decisions is different than
the rule for other sorts of decisions," for example, the denial of a promotion, in
determining discriminatory conduct. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
79, at *2. Counsel for the Petitioner answered that, "As a practical matter,
while it's always the case or almost always the case that somebody knows they
have been subject to disparate treatment in a promotions case-they know
they didn't get the promotion and somebody else did-it is frequently possible
for an employee to be subject to disparate pay without ever knowing that she
had been treated differently than anybody else." Id. The speculative nature of
an ongoing effect triggered, for example, by a prior discriminatory refusal to
promote, was not specifically addressed in the oral argument.
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In Ledbetter's case, Ledbetter's pay was established through
performance evaluations. 537 If the evaluations were inaccurate
due to discrimination, it is not improbable that decisions
impacting Ledbetter's future pay were tainted by the prior
discriminatory conduct.
Ledbetter holds that, in cases like the hypothetical situation
previously described, a claim for discrimination may be supported
by evidence gathered at the moment training or a promotion are
denied, but the claim cannot survive if an ongoing impact of the
denial is felt more than 180 days in the future. Again, under a
claim involving the denial of training or job assignment, any
ongoing impact may be more speculative than an absolute
difference in pay, absent a clearly demonstrable intention by the
employer to cause future harm. 538 Regardless, discrimination for
the denial of training or promotion is the relevant act for filing the
claim, rather than its future consequences. The Ledbetter Court
similarly held that Goodyear's act of discriminatorily setting
Ledbetter's pay posed the discrete act, relevant to filing a Title VII

537. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
538. A clearer intention to cause future harm could be made, for example, if
the employee discovered an email, sent by the employee's supervisor to the
personnel office two years previous, that stated, "This employee will not
receive the training, because girls are never promoted to the jobs that use it,"
and, as promised in the email, the employee is denied the training and does
not receive the promotion. If the training and promotion were denied, and the
employee discovers the email more than 180 days after the denial of training,
the employee could not file under Title VII; the employee would have an
immediate right to sue for the denial itself, as a violation of Title VII, but the
right to sue is foreclosed if the suit is not timely. Furthermore, if the employee
immediately saw the email, the employee would be on notice that a Title VII
violation occurred, and would be compelled to file a Title VII claim within 180
days of the incident.
One could ignore the Ledbetter result and stretch the example further: the
employee files a Title VII action, and, despite Ledbetter, the two-year-old email
is considered in evaluating the employee's claim. The employer produces
evidence that the failure to promote was based on an objectively valid reason
(an allegation made by Ledbetter's employer). In this example, the prior
discriminatory statements balanced against the objectively valid reason
provide evidence of a mixed motive. The Court dealt previously with the issue
of mixed motives in discrimination cases such as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989) and Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 125 S. Ct. 2148
(2003) (regarding mixed motive cases since the 1991 amendment of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(m)). The difference between valid reasons for
the respective decisions in the stretched example and in Ledbetter is that, in
Ledbetter, the supervisor's actions affected Ledbetter's future pay, as
understood by the jury that considered his conduct in the district court.
Goodyear could not provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Ledbetter's prior performance reviews and pay, and, indeed, was not required
by the Court to provide nondiscriminatory reasons for the supervisor's actions.
Goodyear only offered explanations for Ledbetter's performance review and
pay contemporaneous with the 180-day deadline.
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claim, and the tainted pay's ongoing impact is irrelevant, since it
occurred outside the time period.

VI. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Within months of the decision, Congress took up Justice
Ginsburg's challenge to rectify the Ledbetter result.5 39 Both the
Senate and the House of Representatives introduced bills designed
specifically to address Ledbetter, and both "take effect as if enacted
on May 28, 2007 and apply to all claims of discrimination in
compensation under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.)... that are pending on or after that
date."540 Ledbetter's appeal was decided by the Supreme Court on
May 29, 2007.541
The House of Representatives version (H.R. 2831, short title,
the "Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007") stated:
Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation
of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an
individual is affected by application of a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages,
benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part
from such a decision or other practice.
(B) In addition to any relief authorized by section 1977a of the
Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1981a), liability may accrue and an
aggrieved person may obtain relief as provided in subsection (g)(1),
including recovery of back pay for up to two years preceding the
filing of the charge, where the unlawful employment practices that
have occurred during the charge filing period are similar or related
to unlawful employment practices with regard to discrimination in
compensation that occurred outside the time for filing a charge. 542

539. "[T]he ball is in Congress's court .... [T]he Legislature may act to
correct this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII." Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at
2188.
540. H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007); S.1843, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007).
541. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2162. Both bills also amend other Civil Rights
law, including the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), regarding
claims for discriminatory pay brought under the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111,
12203). H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007); S. 1843, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007).
542. H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. § 3(A-B) (2007).
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54 3
The House passed the bill on July 31, 2007.
The Senate bill (S. 1843, short title, the "Fair Pay Restoration
Act") was introduced on July 30, 2007,54 4 and stated:

Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation
of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an
individual is affected by application of a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages,
benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part
from such a decision or other practice.
(B) Liability may accrue and (in addition to any relief authorized by
section 1977A of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1981a)), an
aggrieved person may obtain relief as provided in subsection (g)(1),
including recovery of back pay for up to 2 years preceding the filing
of the charge, in an action under this title concerning an unlawful
employment practice with regard to discrimination in compensation,
where the unlawful employment practice that has occurred during
the charge filing period is similar or related to an unlawful
employment practice with regard to discrimination in compensation
545
that occurred outside the charge filing period.
The Senate version essentially replicated the House bill.
Both limit recovery of back pay to a maximum of two years
accruing prior to the action.5 46 On April 23, 2008, a Senate cloture
motion on the bill (a procedural action) foreclosed the Senate's
debate and consideration of the bill by a roll call vote, making
5 47
uncomplicated passage of the bill unlikely.

543. H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007)
544. S. 1843, 110th Cong. (2007).
545. S. 1843, 110th Cong. § 3(A-B) (2007).
546. H.R. 2831, amending 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), adding § (3)(B)
(2007); S. 1843, amending 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), adding § (3)(B)
(2007).
547. Roll Call Vote of the United States Sentate, http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll call lists/rollcallvote cfm.cfm?congress= 110&session=2&
vote=00110 (last visited April 28, 2008); see also GovTrack.us, http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s2008-110 (last visited April 28, 2008);
Lori Montgomery, Senate Republicans Block Pay Disparity Measure, Wash.
Post, April 24, 2008 at A04, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2008/04/23/AR2008042301553.html?hpid%3moreheadlines&sub=AR
(last visited April 28, 200)) (discussing the cloture motion); CivilRights.org,
http://www.civilrights.org/press room/buzz_clips/civilrights org-storiesedbetter
derailed.html?templateName29304 566print=t (last visited April 28, 2008)
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President Bush pledged to veto legislation passed in response
to Ledbetter.54s The White House issued the following statement
on July 27, 2007 (just before the House of Representatives passed
its version of the bill):
H.R. 2831 would allow employees to bring a claim of pay or other
employment-related discrimination years or even decades after the
alleged discrimination occurred. H.R. 2831 constitutes a major
change in, and expanded application of, employment discrimination
law. The change would serve to impede justice and undermine the
important goal of having allegations of discrimination expeditiously
resolved ....
The legislation does not appear to be based on
evidence that the current statute of limitations principles have
caused any systematic prejudice to the interests of employees, but it
is reasonable to expect the bill's vastly expanded statute of
limitations would exacerbate the existing heavy burden on the
549
courts by encouraging the filing of stale claims.
Other pledges to fight Congressional action came, for
example, from the United States Chamber of Commerce 550 and the
National Association of Manufacturers. 551
Contrary to the
("Forty-two senators used a procedural vote to block the bill from debate. Only
34 votes are needed to block debate on a bill in the Senate, although debate
could continue if 60 senators vote to remove the block.").
548. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY, H.R. 2831 - Lilly

Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.

whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110- 1/hr283 1sap-r.pdf;

see also Robert

Barnes, Exhibit A in Painting Court as Too Far Right, WASH. POST, Sept. 5,

2007, at A19 ("the White House has said it opposes the bill and has threatened
a veto."). Note that the bills limit an employer's potential liability to two years
for discriminatory pay practices precipitated by acts that occur prior to the
180-day limitation established by Title VII.
549. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, supra note 556. The President's
concern for "other employment-related discrimination" must stem from the
House bill's inclusion of, for example, liability not only under Title VII, but
also under actions claimed through the Americans with Disabilities Act,

because the discrimination specifically addressed by the bills is pay
discrimination.
550. According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, if the bill
became law, "it would effectively do away with statutes of limitations." U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CHAMBER FIGHTS BILLS TO INCREASE PAY
DISCRIMINATION
LAWSUITS,
available at http://www.uschamber.com/
publications/weekly/update/070807c.htm (last visited April 30, 2008) (letter
opposing the House of Representatives bill (H.R. 2831), July 27, 2007).
551. The National Association of Manufacturers stated "(H.R. 2831) would
make it very difficult for employers to rectify cases of discrimination and pave
the way to endless litigation against businesses." News Release, National
Association of Manufacturers, Fair Pay Act Is Too Broad in Scope (July 31,
2007), available at http://www.nam.org/s-nam/docl.asp?TracklD=&SID=l&
DID=239086&CID=98&VID=2&RTID=O&CIDQS=&Taxonomy=False&special
Search=False (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). "We do not believe removing
incentives for prompt resolution of discrimination claims benefits the
employee or the employer." Letter from Jay Timmons, Senior Vice President
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President and the referenced business organizations, the
American Bar Association ("ABA") issued a news release in
support of Congress's action, stating: "[T]he ABA urges Congress
to ensure that in claims involving discrimination in compensation,
the statute of limitations runs from each payment reflecting the
claimed unlawful disparity. If adopted by Congress, such a policy
would effectively allow employees to sue for pay discrimination at
5 52
any time it is discovered."
The practical effect of the Ledbetter decision ignores claims
that only become actionable over time, as pay differences become
sufficiently large enough to notice, and Ledbetter, furthermore,
sets the stage for new employees to initiate, as one of their first
acts with a new employer, the filing of a lawsuit if they merely
suspect discriminatory pay.5 5 3 The employees must sue, under
Ledbetter, or they loose the right to sue later. Encouraging
lawsuits in general is not the intent of Title VII, 55 4 nor did the
Court likely intend such a result, but if one's right to sue for
discriminatory pay lasts for only six months, the suspicion that

for Policy and Government Relations (July 27, 2007), available at
http://www.nam.org/s-namdoc l.asp?TracklD=&SID=1&DID=239072&CID=2
02688&VID=2&RTID=O&CIDQS=&Taxonomy=False&specialSearch=False.
552. News Release, American Bar Association, Policy Adopted at ABA
Meeting Urges Congress to Override Executive Order on Interrogation,
Addresses Government State Secrets Claims, Weighs in on Ledbetter Pay
Discrimination Case (Aug. 14, 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
abanet/media/release/newsrelease.cfm?releaseid=167 (last visited April 30,
2008).
553. See also Lorance, 490 U.S. at 919 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing
the initiation of a lawsuit when the plaintiff merely suspects discrimination
involving a seniority system, "employees must now anticipate, and initiate
suit to prevent, future adverse applications of a seniority system, no matter
how speculative or unlikely these applications may be."). Justice Ginsburg
also cited in Ledbetter to the Lorance dissent. 127 S.Ct. at 2183. The Lorance
decision was ameliorated though Congress's amendment to Title VII:
For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs ... when
the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the
seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of
the seniority system or provision of the system.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2).
554. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)
and Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (discussing the
goals of Title VII, "The phrase 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment'
evinces a Congressional intent to 'strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women' in employment"). See also, Benjamin J. Morris,
A Door Left Open? Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan and Its Effect on PostFiling Discrete Acts in Employment DiscriminationSuits, 43 CAL. W. L. REV.
497, 502 (2007) ("The goal of Title VII was to rectify past and prevent future
workplace discrimination and to provide a remedy for economically injured
employees.").
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one's pay is discriminatory will force potential plaintiffs to file.
Congress may disrupt this result.

VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held that Lilly Ledbetter failed to file a
timely Title VII action for discriminatory pay. The circuit courts
that have heard claims similar to Ledbetter's, with the exception
of the Eleventh Circuit, found such claims to be consistent with
both Title VII's time limitations and the law governing timely
filing announced in the Court's prior cases.
Congress has
attempted to amend Title VII. The reasoning and the result
reached by the Court pose significant challenges to potential
plaintiffs who face discriminatory treatment at work based upon
their compensation. For plaintiffs like Ledbetter, the need to
change the law is critical if the goal of Title VII to eliminate
employment discrimination is to be preserved.

555. Rather than fashioning an amendment specific to pay (Title VII had
been previously and specifically amended, for example, in response to seniority
concerns after Lorance), Congress could have tried to change to the law so that
it permitted filing when a potential plaintiff knew or should have known that
he or she had been discriminatorily treated, regardless of the specific harm
allegedly suffered. If Congress's amendments were phrased in this way, a
plaintiff like Ledbetter could file when she discovered the pay discrepancy
(and Ledbetter did not know about the discrepancy until late in the game,
owing to her employer's confidentiality policy regarding pay). Employers
would, however, under this broader approach, be subject to a greater variety of
actions, including, for example, a claim that, due to a discriminatory denial of
training years ago, the employee was eventually denied a promotion. The
speculative nature of the ongoing harm may, however, counsel against such an
amendment

